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[I]f an exchange between two parties is voluntary, it will not take place
unless both believe they will benefit from it. Most economic fallacies
derive from the neglect of this simple insight, from the tendency to
assume that there is a fixed pie, that one party can gain only at the
expense of another.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Note argues that allowing free assignability and creating
primary and secondary markets consisting of current and futurecontingent tort claims, will be more beneficial to nearly all parties
involved in the current tort system. In essence, pareto efficiency 2 can be
achieved through the application of this proposed mechanism.
1.

MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT

13 (1980).
2. Pareto-efficiency, also known as Pareto-optimality or allocative efficiency, is a situation
where no party can be made better off without the harming of another. If however, one party can be
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The American tort system is not a stagnant system; it has evolved
as the needs of society have changed. "The law of torts is anything but
static, and the limits of its development are never set.",3 This statement
holds true for the general common law itself; as Holmes stated "because
an idea seems very familiar and natural to us, that it has always been so.
Many things which we take for granted have
had to be laboriously
4
fought out of [sic] thought out in past times. ,
A classic and relevant example of this change is easily visible by
the pervasive use of contingency fee arrangements in the legal
profession. Today these are common place and of little question or
dispute, yet there was a time when "[flew other issues cut so deeply into
social mores and professional concerns in an urban industrial age.",5 The
legality of this type of fee arrangement was settled by the United States
Supreme Court in Stanton v. Embrey by stating a contingent fee was
"beyond legitimate controversy." 6 If the law can evolve to include the

contingency fee arrangement, which at its very core is nothing more then
a risk-shifting device and on its face appears to violate the laws of
champerty.7 It is then certainly plausible to advance a theory that
depends on the removal and abridgment of ancient doctrines
whose
8
underlying policies are no longer relevant to today's society.
The tort system in America costs about 180 billion dollars each
year or 1.8 percent of a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 9 of 10.2 trillion
dollars. 10 The Council of Economic Advisors estimated that in 2002,
made better off without another party suffering harm, then the system is not pareto efficient until
such a change is undertaken. RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 275-76 (9th ed. 1997).
3. Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491,496 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
4. OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 2 (Barnes & Noble Books 2004)
(1881).
5. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 44 (1976).

6. 93 U.S. 548, 556 (1877) (citing Wright v. Tebbitts, 91 U.S. 252 (1876); Wylie v. Cox, 56
U.S. 415 (1854)); see also AUERBACH, supra note 5, at 45.
7. Compare Schomp v. Schenck, 40 N.J.L. 195, 201 (N.J. 1878) (recognizing that according
to the English statutes the payment of an attorney from any recovery would be champertous), with
15 GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY
§ 3.12 (rev. ed. 2003) (noting that contingency fee contracts on their face would champertous;
however, over the years courts have viewed these contracts as enforceable).
8. For a discussion ofchamptery, see infra note 33.
9. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is "[t]he market value of goods and services produced by
labor and property in the United States, regardless of nationality; GDP replaced... (GNP) as the
primary measure of U.S. production in 1991." US Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic
Analysis Glossary, at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/glossary/glossaryg.htm.
10. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, WHO PAYS FOR TORT LIABILITY CLAIMS?: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM 2 (2002), available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/tortliabilitysystem apr02.pdf, see also Press Release, Bureau of
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twenty percent of the total system cost went back to injured parties as
compensation for economic damages, leaving eighty percent allocated to
transaction costs and non economic damages."l With this economic
background in mind, it becomes obvious that the potential exists for
people to reap a profit if they can introduce efficiency into the system by
reducing transaction costs. Part of the profit these individuals would reap
would be a reward for assuming some of the system's risk;
consequently, there are several benefits that accrue on a system wide
basis and individual level as a result of a willing assumption of risk.
Transaction costs in the tort system arise due to an inherently high
level of risk associated with tort litigation. In response to this element of
the system, a person takes measures to reduce his or her risk, such as
hiring a lawyer; however, these measures have associated costs. This
Note proposes the idea of a market-based system whereby people will be
able to shift their risk at a low cost to a party more willing to bear the
burden. This will be accomplished by allowing people to sell their claim
to the highest bidder. In return for the guaranteed compensation to the
seller, the buyer will have the opportunity to either resell the claim to a
fourth-party on a secondary market, or bring action upon the claim and
keep the resulting judgment award.
A clear and concise definition of what exactly is being exchanged is
fundamental to the understanding of this proposed market mechanism. A
current claim is either: (i) "the right to receive or recover a debt,
demand, or damages on a cause of action ex contractu or for a tort or
omission of duty,"' 2 or (ii) the right to defend against the right to receive
or recover a debt, demand, or damages on a cause of action ex contractu
or for a tort or omission of duty. A future-contingent claim is either: (i)
the future-contingent right to receive or recover a debt, demand, or
damages on a cause of action ex contractu or for a tort or omission of
duty, or (ii) the future-contingent right to defend against the right to

Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 2001 (Final), Corporate Profits:
Fourth
Quarter
2001
(Mar.
28th,
2002),
at
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/newsrelarchive/2002/gdp401fhtm (containing the final GDP amounts
for 2001 and Current Dollar GDP is measured at $10,263.3 billion).
11. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 10, at 9.
12. See Picadilly Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338, 339 n.1(Ind. 1991) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 219 (5th ed. 1979)) (holding that a legal malpractice claim could not be assigned to an
adversary). The Court defined a chose in action as "the right to receive or recover a debt, demand,
or damages on a cause of action ex contractu or for a tort or omission of a duty." Id.(internal
quotation omitted). This definition forms the basis for the definition of claim presented in this paper,
the only change being the addition of a party-specific point of view and a temporal element.
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receive or recover a debt, demand, or damages on a cause of action ex
contractu or for a tort or omission of duty.
Consider the most simple tort scenario where a plaintiff "P" suffers
a redressable injury as result of a defendant's "D" action. The typical
characterization of these facts is that P has a right to seek redress from
D. More importantly it is commonly believed that P's right to redress
arises from a personal relationship between the two. 13 The personal
aspect of this relationship is extremely
significant, since this type of
14
relationship cannot be assigned.
This characterization is not the only possible one. Consider the
same scenario, but instead of insisting on a personal-relationship
characterization, apply the same facts through the perspective of a
debtor-creditor relationship. P could be considered an unwilling creditor
of D. P's creditor status emerges as a result of D's tortious conduct. This
is analogous to the way a widget-seller becomes a creditor if the buyer
keeps the merchandise but does not pay the price. However, in the tort
scenario P had no choice in the matter; he becomes a creditor through no
action of his own. Naturally, D now becomes a debtor since he owes P
damages for his actions. D additionally retains the sole non-transferable
right and ability to redeem the debt in a transaction normally called a
settlement. One might believe that it is a settlement of a tort; however, it
is more accurate to characterize the transaction as the settlement of an
outstanding debt or obligation.
This Note presents an alternative solution, the creation of secondary
market for both post and pre-injury claims.15 At the core of this proposed
system are fundamental changes between the interaction of the laws of
contracts and torts. A secondary market can exist only if rights can be
traded freely within a regulated framework. This requires modification
or the outright removal of several ancient doctrines related to the
assignability of causes of action.
Much of the scholarship in this area has focused on the creation of 1a6
market for tort claims as a response to a crisis within the system.
Furthermore, prior scholarship has historically been divided into two
13.
14.
15.

J.B. Ames, Inalienability ofChoses in Action, 3 HARV. L. REv. 337, 339 (1890).
See id.
By definition, a secondary market requires the existence of a primary market. A primary

market is made up of the original exchange from victim to first purchaser. The secondary market is
made up of any subsequent sale of the claim. See Business A to Z: A Glossary of Business Terms,
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/longterm/glossary/n z/secondary market.htm.
16.

See, e.g., Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12

YALE J. ON REG. 435, 442 (1995) (detailing a market strategy to address the "numerous [and]
serious problems" in the current tort system).
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17
very separate and distinct categories: matured and unmatured claims.
This Note attempts to bridge this gap by advancing the theory that these
two ideas are inherently related.
The "pre-accident" scholars, notably Professors Robert Cooter,
Stephen Sugarman, and Jeffery O'Connell have strongly advocated for a
future-contingent claims market. 18 Although this Note's proposed
market includes the concept of a future-contingent claim, it does not
presuppose what the terms of the exchange would be. Instead it
advocates a true market instead of a guaranteed compensation scheme of
full or expanded medical benefits and income support. 19 Another key
difference explored in this Note is the creation of a secondary market for
future-contingent claims. The sale would not result in the claim being
owned by an insurance company or tortfeasor. Instead the focus is on
giving the potential victim the choice to sell and concurrently ensure that
this choice does not create adverse effects felt by other parties or the
system as a whole.
The fundamental difference between my proposed system and those
aforementioned is the goal of using the market to achieve pareto
efficiency. Additionally, positive externalities may be felt throughout the
tort system as a byproduct of the market. The goal of the proposed
system is to harness the power of the market by increasing choices. This
increase in choice allows each party to settle comfortably into a role,
based on his or her risk tolerance, without sacrificing traditional tort
objectives or altering the substantive law of torts.
Although the application of market economics to the tort system is
still in a theoretical phase, there is evidence that business oriented people

17.

See, e.g., id. at 455 (criticizing the "pre-accident market"); see also ROBERT COOTER &

STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, A Regulated Market in Unmatured Tort Claims: Tort Reform by Contract,
in NEW DIRECTION IN LIABILITY LAW 174 (W. Olson ed., 1988) (presenting a proposal for a market

of unmatured tort claims "that could correct many shortcomings of existing tort law").
18. See, e.g., COOTER & SUGARMAN, supra note 17; see also Jeffrey O'Connell & Janet
Beck, Overcoming Legal Barriers to the Transfer of Third-Party Tort Claims as a Means of

FinancingFirst-PartyNo-Fault Insurance, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 55, 55-56 (1980) (suggesting that the
deal in a future-contingent market be one for insurance, whereby the party would receive no-fault
insurance in return for the assignment of claims to the insurer).
19. See COOTER & SUGARMAN, supra note 17, at 174 (envisioning "a market in which people
who are otherwise adequately insured against accidents will sell their preaccident bargaining
chips"); see also, Jeffrey O'Connell, Harnessingthe Liability Lottery: Elective First-PartNo-Fault
Insurance Finanancedby Third-Party Tort Claims, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 693, 697 (1978) (arguing
that "[e]lective first-party no-fault insurance" would be a bargain premised upon on the insurer
offering no-fault insurance benefits to the insured in return for "absolute assignment of the insured's
tort claim"). Cooter & Sugarman go on to suggest that the main actors in the market would be
"workers with good employment-benefit packages" selling their claims to their employers who
would presettle (sell) them to their liability insurers.
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are beginning to inch closer to engaging in champerty. 20 The most
notable example is litigation support firms, who generally limit their
activity to appeals. 21 Although these firms do not yet assume control of
the litigation, it would be a natural evolution of the business to
eventually take over the litigation as is suggested by the argument put
forth here.
Part II explores the origin and historical evolution of the prohibition
of assignment of claims and its underlying rationale, as well as the nonuniform application of the prohibition in American jurisprudence today.
Part III undertakes an examination of the tort system today by separating
it out into two components: micro-tort 22 and macro-tort. 23 The baseline

of the tort system is explained, detailing the major goals and incentives
that currently affect participants. Part IV introduces the market system,
its basic function, and provides an overview of the advantages the
system will deliver to each party involved. Part V explains how the
market system will have positive effects on the macro-tort concepts of
deterrence and compensation, while further reducing vengeance as a
decision influencing factor. Part VI examines the chief legal obstacles of
champerty, maintenance, and barratry as well as some public policy
concerns that are or may prevent the development of the market, and
why these obstacles should be removed. Part VII inspects non-legal
issues that must be overcome in order for the market system to work and
presents possible solutions.
II. THE ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE PROHIBITION OF
ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS, ITS UNDERLYING RATIONALE, AND THE NONUNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE PROHIBITION IN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE

The black letter rule of law has been that a cause of action is not
assignable;2 4 one commentator has referred to this rule as having the
20.

See generally Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits: An Increasingly

Popular(andLegal)Business, 33 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 57 (1999).
21. Id. at 79-80 (detailing the functioning of the Judgment Purchase Corporation, whereby the
company becomes an investor in the appeal and takes a percentage from the winnings, but they do
not assume control of the litigation).
22. Micro-tort focuses on the relationships among individuals within the system, especially
the plaintiff and defendant. See discussion infra Part III.A.
23. Macro-tort focuses on the societal interests that affect the system. See discussion infra
Part III.B.
24. See, e.g., Picadilly Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338, 339-40 (Ind. 1991) ("Under ancient
common law hardly any chose of action was assignable.") (citing SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 405, at 7 (3d ed. 1960)); Dodd v. Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co., 698
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"widest application.,1 5 The origins of the rule against assignment stem
from a historical sentiment that the only parties who should be involved
in litigation are the two litigants and the judge.2 6 It was believed that the
27
inclusion of anyone else, in any capacity, could only lead to mischief.
This notion extends back through Roman law, where no one but the
litigants and the officers of the court had any business with the court.28
A.

The Ancient Origins of the Prohibition

It is worthwhile to consider ancient Athens and the issues
associated with the sycophancy. 29 In Athens there was great political
capital to be earned from successful prosecutions, not to mention the
possibility of rewards. 30 With the rewards that a sycophant could
receive, it is easy to envision how such power would be abused in a legal
system lacking the intricate safeguards in place against malicious
prosecution that we have today.
Eventually, sycophancy became a means of "political agitation"
and people would pledge their support to each other against common
political rivals. 31 This abuse of powers and the primitive legal systems
whence it first appeared are the primary reasons for the development of a
blanket ban on assignment. 2 Without assignment there would be no
need to attempt to regulate the actions of the sycophants. Of course
Athens did not have the prohibition on assignment of causes of actions
that exists today. The "modem" form of the prohibition stems from
medieval England and the related concepts of champerty,3 3
A.2d 859, 865 (Conn. 1997) ("Under common law a cause of action for personal injuries cannot be
assigned.").
25. J.B. Ames, supra note 13, at 337.
26. See generally Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48 (1936)
(tracing the evolution of the doctrines of maintenance and champerty from ancient times until the
first half of the twentieth century).
27. Id. at 48.
28. Id.; see also Merchant's Protective Ass'n v. Jacobson, 127 P. 315, 317 (Idaho 1912)
("Maintenance of causes of action was denounced by the Roman law in the strongest terms.").
29. Sycophancy is a technical term of Greek law. It is the bringing of unnecessary or baseless
actions in both civil and criminal actions. See Radin, supra note 26, at 49.
30. Id.
31. Id.at 51. ("Sycophancy was, however, not merely a device by which individuals profited
either in money or prestige. It became a recognized means of political agitation and a part of the
organized activity of what we should call political parties." "[T]here is abundant evidence that the
members of these [Athenian political] clubs were pledged to support each other in the litigation
which was deliberately fomented against political antagonists.").
32. See Radin, supra note 26, at 54.
33. Compare 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 134-35
(Dawsons of Pall Mall 1966) (1775) ("Champerty is a species of maintenance; a bargain with a
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maintenance, 34 and barratry. 35 Ironically, in Athens one was allowed to
purchase an interest in a current claim, 36 Roman law; however, did not
permit such an acquisition; 37 as discussed below the dangers of such
assignments are no longer present in our legal system.
B.

The English Origins of Champerty, Maintenance,and Barratry

Medieval society viewed legal proceedings as a dangerous
procedure; this is not surprising considering a legal system that
permitted trial by battle.38 The inherent physical danger of trial, coupled
with the Christian sentiment of forgiveness and turning the other cheek,
led people to believe that litigation was an indication of an un-Christian
spirit. 39 Therefore, anything that could increase the amount of litigation
in society was viewed as an evil to be avoided.
Also, the concept of usury played an important role in the formation
of the English version of the prohibitions on assignment.40 The investor
would be purchasing the mere chance to recover on the claim; this was
bound in speculation. 4' Speculation, no doubt back then, as it does today,
appeals to those who have resources to speculate and the ability to reap
the rewards of their actions. In the medieval mind, speculation would
surely increase the amount of litigation because the purchasers of claims
would be better able to handle litigation than the original parties.42 Thus,
the high stakes and complicated nature of litigation kept many valid
claims from being brought.43 Lord Coke, in Lampet's Case, said of the
prohibition:
party to litigation to divide the subject of the suit, if successful; where the champertor is to carry on
the party's suit at his own expense. Champerty signifies the purchase of a suit or the right to sue."),
with Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11, 12 (Or. 1891) ("Some of the authorities omit from their definition

the statement that the champertor is to carry on the suit at his own expense, and confine it simply to
an agreement to aid a suit, and then divide the thing recovered.") (citations omitted).
34. BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at 134-35. Maintenance is the "officious intermeddling in a
suit that no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party with money or otherwise, to
prosecute or defend it." Id.
35. Id. at 133. Barratry "is the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up suits and quarrels
between... (people) at law or otherwise." Id.
36.

Radin, supra note 26, at 51.

37. Id. at 52.
38. Id. at 58.
39.

Id.

40. Id. at 61.
41. Id. at 60-61.
42.
43.

See Radin, supra note 26, at 60, 68.
See Thomas Lund, The Modern Mind of the Medieval Lawyer, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1267,

1274 ("But given the pitfalls of medieval litigation concerning ownership-complicated doctrines,
difficult methods of, endless days dangers of improper influence, periods of 'dispeace'-a rightful
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And first was observed the great wisdom and policy of the sages and
founders of our law, who have provided that no possibility, right, title,
nor thing in action, shall be granted or assigned to strangers, for that
would be the occasion of multiplying of contentions and suits, of great
oppression of the people .... 44

The socio-economic climate of England also needs to be
considered.
There
was
increasing
tension
between
the
4
5
merchant/capitalist class and the landed aristocracy. If the tenants who
toiled under the aristocracy had a valid claim against their landlord, they
would be able to sell it to a merchant for a sum of money.4 6 The
aristocrat would then have had to defend the suit against an individual of
similar prestige and economic status, making it more difficult for him.47
The prohibition therefore also served to protect the aristocratic status
quo.
The English basis for the prohibition can be fit into four broad
categories: (i) discouraging speculation, which is thought to promote
frivolous litigation; 48 (ii) the personal nature relationship view of
lawsuits; 49 (iii) protecting the weaker parts of society from being abused
through the legal system; 50 and (iv) preventing the rich
and powerful
51
vendettas.
personal
satisfy
to
system
legal
the
from using
All four of the above policies, even if they are considered important
today, are no longer effectively served by the laws of champerty and
maintenance. As Professor Radin stated: "[t]he condemnation of
litigiousness alone remains as a common element in the medieval and
modem attitudes, but neither then nor now did it play a controlling
owner had many perils to weather before he could bash in the halcyon bliss of judicially decreed
ownership.").
44. Lampet's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 994, 997 (1727).
45. Radin, supra note 26, at 61.
46. See id.
47. Merchant's Protective Ass'n v. Jacobson, 127 P. 315, 317 (Idaho 1912). The rules of
maintenance and champerty "may have been invoked as much for the protection of the feudal lords
against each other as for their weaker and less influential subjects." Id.
48. See Martin, supra note 20, at 58 (citing Note, The Effect of Champerty on Contractual
Liability, 79 L.Q. REv. 493, 494 (1963)); see also Radin, supra note 26, at 54 ("The purchaser of
law suits ... was at worst a lay figure designed to help extortionists to escape and at best a
speculator or gambler.").
49. Ames, supra note 13, at 339 ("[A] chose in action always presupposes a personal relation
between two individuals."); Radin, supra note 26, at 54 ("[A] controversy properly concerned only
the persons actually involved in the original transaction.").
50. Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 623, 643 (N.Y. 1824) (chronicling the policies behind
the English doctrine of Maintenance and stating that one of the policies was the prevention of
"oppression which followed from the influence of great men, in such cases").
51. Radin, supra note 26, at 65.
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role. ' 2 The Court for the Correction of Errors of New York in 1824,
with similar sentiment, observed "[i]n many States of this Union these
laws are not in force, and the want of them, is said to no
inconvenience., 53 The evolution of society has reached such a point that
the harms that the laws of champerty and maintenance were designed to
are more effectively controlled by other safety checks in
protect against
54
the system.
C. Champerty, Maintenance,Barratry,and Assignment of Claims in
the American Legal System Today
The exact status of the doctrine of champerty in American common
law is subject to "a diversity of opinion among the courts. 5 5 There are
four basic positions reflected in American jurisprudence today: (i) no
enforcement of the laws of maintenance and champerty; (ii) only
lawyers are subjected to the laws of maintenance and champerty; (iii)
some claims are subject to the laws and other are not; (iv) the full
prohibition of maintenance and champerty is in effect.
1. No Enforcement or Recognition of Maintenance and
Champerty
The best examples of this position are the laws of Massachusetts
and New Jersey. It is prudent to examine New Jersey first, because the
courts and legislature of the state never adopted the laws of maintenance
and champerty.
In its seminal decision in Schomp v. Schenck, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey stated "that the doctrine of maintenance has never had a
foothold in the jurisprudence of this state."5 6 Although this decision is
over 125 years old, the reasoning employed still resonates today on the
topic of maintenance. The court recognized that the laws of maintenance
and champerty were enacted in a time and place that was vastly different

52. Id.at 66.
53. Thallhimer,3 Cow. at 646.
54. James E. Molitemo, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale: "The Acquisition of an Interest
and Financial Assistance in Litigation" Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 223, 251 (2003) ("With

sophisticated controls on frivolous litigation already in place, current acquisition of interest and
financial assistance rules disproportionately prevent the bringing of meritorious claims, not
frivolous ones."); Martin, supra note 20, at 57 (stating "any potential evils associated with
champerty are addressed in a variety of other laws").
55. Merchant's Protective Ass'n v. Jacobsen, 127 P. 315, 317 (Idaho 1912).
56. 40 N.J.L. 195, 203-04 (N.J. 1878).
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then late nineteenth century New Jersey,5 7 a fortiori today's society is
even less like that of medieval England, which necessitated the creation
and applications of the law of maintenance.
The court also noticed, even then, the gradual decline in the
usefulness and applicability of the doctrine stating "[t]hat such doctrine,
repugnant to every honest feeling of the human heart, should be soon
laid aside, must be expected., 58 Further, the court notes that the doctrine
of maintenance is "not altogether in harmony with the habits, needs and
business of modem life. . . ,"9This can be seen as foreshadowing the
eventual rise of modem market economics as a means for not only
solving the problem of scarcity, but for addressing the efficient
allocation of resources as well; one such scarce resource is the
willingness to bear risk.6 °
The contemporary question arising from this decision is: does a
New Jerseyan suffer any added adverse effects from the lack of this law
when compared to a New Yorker? This author believes that a plaintiff in
New Jersey is not likely to suffer any added injustice than a similarly
situated plaintiff in New York. This is because the New York plaintiff
and New Jersey plaintiff are both adequately protected by other laws, for
example the rules against bringing frivolous lawsuits.6'
While New Jersey never recognized the doctrines of champerty and
maintenance, 62 Massachusetts did enforce a common law prohibition
against maintenance and champerty with some exceptions.63 The
recognition of the three interrelated doctrines of champerty,
maintenance, and barratry eliminated in a single case by the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, in Saladini v. Righellis.64
The Saladini case is factually more interesting then the Schomp
case above, because in Saladini the contract was not a contingency fee
between lawyer and client. Rather, it was a contract in which "Saladini
agreed to advance funds to Righellis to allow him to pursue potential
57. Id. at 202 ("[A]ny inquirer into this branch ofjurisprudence will be satisfied that the entire
doctrine of maintenance was the product of a state of society very different from that which now
exists, or has ever existed, in this state.")
58. ld. at 203.
59. Id.
60. The last reason the court does not permit the doctrine of maintenance and champerty to
gain a foothold in New Jersey jurisprudence, is that Judge Paterson, who was authorized by the
legislature to collect the statutes of England that would remain in force in New Jersey, left out the
sections on maintenance and champerty. Schomp, 40 N.J.L. at 204-06.
61. See Martin, supra note 20, at 57.
62. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
63.
64.

See Martin, supra note 20, at 59.
687 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 1997).
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legal claims.
In return Saladini was to receive, from the first amount
his
advance
and fifty percent of any amount after the payment
recovered,
6
6
of expenses. The important things to note in this case are (i) that the
lender was uninterested except for the potential of profit, and (ii) that the
contract called for the lender to make a profit in the case of a successful
suit.
The court decided to invalidate the laws of maintenance and
champerty in the state on many of the same grounds that a New Jersey
court, 119 years earlier, decided to not enforce them in the first place.
Namely, the ancient origins of the doctrine and a doubt as to whether
they continue to serve any useful purpose.6 7 The court also noted that
today's society views litigation as a "socially useful way to resolve
disputes" '68 as opposed to the medieval view of litigation as an evil.
Furthermore, the preference courts have for non-judicial resolution of
disputes may be fostered by allowing people to purchase an interest in an
action. 69 Further buttressing its decision the court recognized, with
respect to the harms the laws of champerty were designed to protect
against, that "[t]here are now other devices that more effectively
accomplish these ends., 70 The decision gave a partial list of the tools
available to courts to prevent injustice, including regulations against
bringing frivolous lawsuits, the doctrines of unconscionability, good
faith, duress, and standards of fair dealing. 7 1
Only Lawyers Are Expressly Prohibited From Engaging In
Champertous Dealings
The best representative of this position is the state of Montana.
Montana's champerty statute is directed only at attorneys.72 The
2.

65. Id. at 1224-25.
66. Id. at 1225.
67. Id at 1226.
68. Id. (quoting F.B. McKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES, REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION 210 (1964)).
69. Saladini,687 N.E.2d at 1226.
70. id. at 1226-27.
71. Id. at 1227.
72. MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-61-408 (2004) states:

Attorney prohibited from buying claim or demand for purpose of bringing action.
(1) An attorney and counselor must not directly or indirectly buy or be in any manner
interested in buying a bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt, or other thing
in action with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an action thereon.
(2) An attorney and counselor must not, by himself or by or in the name of another
person, either before or after action brought, promise or give or procure to be promised
or given a valuable consideration to any person as an inducement to placing or in
consideration of having placed in his hands or in the hands of another person a demand
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Supreme Court of Montana stated in Green v. Gremaux that the policy
behind the statute is .". . to prevent attorneys from stirring up litigation

or becoming involved in a lawsuit solely for personal economic
benefit., 73 From the language of the statute and the holding in the case it
appears that a non-attorney would be able to validly undertake
champertous contracts.
The court's policy does not make much sense, because outside of
pro bono cases and other public interest law, an attorney's primary
motivation for doing anything is payment. His very reason for
involvement in a case is that he seeks to gain personal economic benefit.
The question of how personal economic benefit of attorneys is relevant
to limiting the maintenance statute to the legal profession is not
answered by the Montana Court.
In the only case dealing with the statute following Green, the Court
decides that the statute does not apply for two reasons; firstly, the issue
of personal economic gain in litigation was unpreserved for appeal, and
secondly, the agreement between the parties was a trust in which the
beneficiary retained the final say over which actions would be
prosecuted.74
What the Montana Legislature and Supreme Court have failed to
address is why attorneys as a group require this added measure of
statutory limitation. Furthermore, one is required to ask whether such
rules are needed if they are rarely used. It may be inferred from the lack
of use that attorneys are being regulated from stirring up lawsuits by
other laws and regulations.
3.

Some Claims are Subject to The Laws of Champerty or Similar
Prohibitions and Others are Exempt
The States that fall into this category are more difficult to pin down
because of their varying nature. Two contrasting positions, however, are
worth analysis: The traditional view is one of survivability, if the claim
would survive the death of a party and pass to the estate then it is
assignable.7 5 The more liberal approach is embodied by a case specific

of any kind for the purpose of bringing an action thereon. This subsection does not apply
to an agreement between attorneys and counselors, or either, to divide between
themselves the compensation to be received.

Id.
73.
74.
75.

945 P.2d 903,907 (Mont. 1997).
Balyeat Law, P.C. v. Harrison, 983 P.2d 902, 904 (Mont. 1999).
See infra note 87 and accompanying text; see also Sperry v. Stennick, 129 P. 130, 132
(Or. 1913).
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analysis, determining whether public policy is violated by the
assignment in question.76
Before turning to the states themselves it is important to note the
possible implications of the United States Supreme Court decision in
Comegys v. Vasse. 77 The important aspect of the case is the declaration
and accepting as fact "that mere personal torts, which die with the party,
and do not survive to his personal representative, are not capable of
passing by assignment," contrasted with property interests or those
interests arising out of property which are assignable.78 The Court,
however, did not apply this rule and instead used a more specific rule
dealing with abandonment and insurance. 79 The non-use of the
survivability rule by the Court relegates it to dicta and lacking in
precedential power, thereby leaving the states free to reject or accept it
as they see fit.
Turning to the states, those of interest that fall into this category are
Washington, which still clings to the traditional view; Arkansas, which
has rejected survivability reasoning and just adopted a non-assignabitity
per se rule; and Oregon, which has made the shift from the traditional to
the more liberal position.
Washington State lacks any statutory provision of champerty or
maintenance, however, it uses its survival statute to determine which
causes of action are assignable. Washington State's test of assignability
is "[d]oes the cause of action survive to the personal representative of
the assignor?" 80 In Cooper v. Runnels, the Court enunciated the test,
citing to an 1892 case. 8 1 The Cooper decision is important because it
surveys the law of the state, tracing the development of this rule. In
Cooper,the defendant corporation negligently conducted a paint job and
damaged 137 cars owned by ninety-one individuals. 82 Each car suffered
a small amount of damage. The plaintiff then purchased the ninety-one

76. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
77. 26U.S. 193, 213 (1828).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 213-14. The Court states: "We do not think, that upon an examination of the
doctrines of insurance, there is any difficulty in this part of the case." Id.Furthermore, the Court
mentions "the material consideration here, is, whether upon the principles of the law merchant, the
right, title, interest possibility... to the indemnity awarded in this case, did not pass by the
abandonment to Vasse." Id.
80. Cooper v. Runnels, 291 P.2d 657, 658 (Wash. 1955) (citing Slauson v. Schwabacher Bros.
& Co., 31 P. 329(1892)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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other causes of action and brought suit for all of them, with each cause
of action having an average value of approximately $43.25.83
The court reasoned that if a claim could be maintained by a
personal representative in the event of the death of a plaintiff, then such
a claim could be assigned.84 The court traced the changing nature of
assignability, pointing out that at early common law there were two
reasons for why a tort was not assignable: (i) there was no representative
of a deceased person, therefore there was no survivability; and (ii) the
concept that a personal cause of action dies with the person. Of course,
by tracing and phrasing history in this way the court implies that the rule
on assignability has always been tied to survivability. Hence when
survivability was gradually introduced and expanded in modem
jurisprudence, it had an associated impact on assignability.
The key benefit of the rule is its simplicity which makes it attractive
to the judiciary. It is a bright line test; if the cause of action survives, it is
assignable. The legal analysis in any given case then becomes an
exercise in statutory interpretation. This is demonstrated by the Harvey
v. Cleman decision. 6
In Harvey v. Cleman, the Washington Supreme Court declared the
survivability equals assignability rule to be the rule of the state.87 The
court stated that "[t]he reason, or lack of reason.. ." for the rule is
discussed in Cooper.88 This statement gives rise to the implication that
the reason for the rule is its simplicity. After declaring this to be the rule,
the court launches predictably, into an interpretation of the survivability
statute to see if the claim would survive. 89 Since the cause of action at
issue in the case would not survive because it was for pain and suffering,
it was deemed to be un-assignable. 90
The latest Washington Supreme Court case to address this issue,
Kommavongsa v. Haskell, carves out an exception to the assignability
rule for legal malpractice claims. 9' This decision demonstrated that the
83. Id. (average value is calculated by taking the total amount of claims $3,978.55 and
dividing by the ninety-one claims that were assigned; equaling approximately $43.25).
84. Id. ("[If the cause of action can be maintained against the tort-feasor by the personal
representatives of the property owners, then their assignments to the plaintiff are valid.").
85. Id.
86. 400 P.2d 87, 88 (Wash. 1965).
87. Id. ("The test of assignability in this jurisdiction is whether the cause of action survives to
the personal representative of the assignor. If it does, the cause of action is assignable.").
88. Id.
89. Id. at 88-89 (declaring "[n]o reason has been advanced why... [the survivability equals
assignability rule] should be abandoned in the absence of legislative direction").
90. id. at 90.
91.

Kommavongsav. Haskell, 67 P.3d 1068,1071 (Wash. 2003).
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rule's simplicity and lack of an underlying public policy rationale are its
shortcomings. In Kommavongsa, the defendant assigned his legal
malpractice claims to the plaintiffs as part of a settlement agreement.9 2
The court recognized that the general rule of assignability in Washington
is the survivability test.93 Although the Court refused to announce a
broad rule dealing with all legal malpractice claims, it chose to void the
assignment because of public policy reasons, thereby reluctantly
departing from the survivability statute in this case. 94 In a vigorous
dissent, Judge Ireland pointed out that the law of Washington is the
survivability test, and he argued that the public policy reasons cited by
the majority are insufficient to overcome the bright line rule and
necessitate an exception. 95
Therefore, outside of the exception carved out in Kommavongsa, in
Washington assignability is going to turn on the language of survival
statute section 4.20.046.96 This statute divides claims into two categories
based on the type of damage sustained.97 The key to understanding the
rule of assignability, in light of the statute, is to determine if the cause of
action would survive to the personal representative, not in whether it
would survive to the beneficiaries of section 4.20.046.98 Therefore, even
though there is no statute dealing with champerty, maintenance, or the
common law version of barratry, 99 it appears that the statute would
prohibit the assignments contemplated by this Note. This is because the
claims include all damages, some of which are not covered under the
statute. Of course the assignment of injuries to personal property or for

92. Id.
93. Id. at 1072 ("The traditional test for assignability of a cause of action in Washington is
this: Does the cause of action survive to the personal representative of the assignor? If it does, the
cause of action is assignable.") (quoting Cooper v. Runnels, 291 P.2d 657, 658 (Wash. 1955)).
94. Id. at 1070 ("We answer that narrow question in the negative on the grounds of public
policy, leaving for another day the broader issue of whether legal malpractice claims may be
assignable in other circumstances.").
95. Id. at 1084-86 (Ireland, J., dissenting).
96. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.046 (2004).
97. Id. ("All causes of action by a person.., against another person ... shall survive to the
personal representatives ... Provided,however... That no personal representative shall be entitled
to recover damages for pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, or humiliation;" missing for
example would be punitive damages arising from the events.).
98. Kommavongsa, 67 P.3d at 1084 (Ireland, J., dissenting) ("[T]he test for assignability in
Washington is whether the cause of action would survive to the personal representative of the
assignor upon his or her death.").
99.

Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.12.010 (2004) (defining Barratry as the bringing of

a false suit with the intent to harass or distress a defendant), with 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at
37 (providing the common law definition of Barratry).
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economic damages would appear to be legal in Washington even though
no factoring100 would have occurred at all."'
The key case on point in Arkansas is Southern Farm Bureau
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Wright Oil Co. 102 In the case, Mr. Hickson
owed Wright Oil $1,206.24.03 Mr. Hickson also had unliquidated
personal injury claims, "arising from a traffic collision, against Howard
Cox and his liability insurer" Southern Farm.' 0 4 Mr. Hickson decided to

assign $1,206.24 of his tort claim against Cox and Southern Farm to
Wright Oil.'0 5 Subsequently, Mr. Hickson settled with Southern Farm
and Wright Oil received no money. 10 6 Wright Oil then launched a
Cox, and Southern Farm);
lawsuit against all three defendants (Hickson,
107
appeal.
to
one
only
the
was
Farm
Southern
The court then goes on to discuss the origins of the survivability
equals assignability doctrine. 10 8 In Arkansas the rule "causes of action
that survive are assignable; those that do not survive are not assignable"
developed from a dicta opinion. 10 9 The court recognizes that the fusion
of the two doctrines occurred over time, almost subconsciously.' 10 The
court goes so far as to point out that in previous cases when this rule is
adopted it has been without a discussion of "the basic issue of public
policy in the course of holding that survivability carries with it
assignability with respect to personal injury claims."'' One possible
reason that the court advances for the marrying of survivability and
assignment, is that the early cases invalidating assignment of a claim did
so on the grounds that the claim did not survive the death of the injured
person. 112 Therefore, when legislatures began to adopt statutes that
provided for the survivability of those claims, the previous reasoning

100. The definition of factoring is "[tlhe buying of accounts receivable at a discount ...The
price is discounted because the factor (who buys them) assumes the risk of delay in collection and
loss on the accounts receivable." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 234 (7th ed. 1999).

101.

Kommavongsa, 67 P.3d at 1086 (Ireland, J., dissenting).

102.
103.
104.

454 S.W.2d 69 (Ark. 1970).
See id.
See id.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See id
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.(quoting Ark. Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 161 S.W. 136 (Ark. 1913)).
See id.
Id. at 71.
(quoting Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lea, 410 P.2d 495 (Ark. 1966)).
See id.
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appeared to have been defeated, and11 those
previously unassignable
3
assignable.
considered
now
were
claims
The survivability statute of Arkansas does not mention
assignability, rather it spells out what rights pass on to the estate of a
deceased person.' 14 The court, believing that it is no longer necessary to
use the survivability statute to separate assignable and non-assignable
claims, decided to adopt the per se rule that no personal injury claim
115 As a basis for its ruling the Court cites to
should be assignable.
"public policy." 116 This reasoning implies that a shift in those
fundamental supporting public policies would necessarily invalidate the
new rule. However, the court fails to enumerate even a single public
policy supporting the new rule once it is debased from its historical root
of survivability. This most probably suggests that the policies would be
similar to those of champerty and maintenance.
Oregon has oscillated between adopting the liberal, case by case
analysis, and the traditional, survivability equals assignability, positions.
In Brown v. Bigne, the Oregon Supreme Court was faced with the issue
of whether to adopt the doctrines of champerty and maintenance as law
in its jurisdiction. 1 7 However, in a decision whose reasoning should still
resonate today, the court decided that champerty and maintenance were
no longer bright line rules, and their scope was limited to "speculation in
lawsuits, and to repress the gambling propensity of buying up doubtful
claims." ' 1 8 The court enunciates the rule that champertous agreements
should be governed by the intent of the champertor. 119 If the purchaser
had a "bonafide object of assisting a claim believed to be just" then the
contract is valid; if however it is for "the purpose of injuring and
oppressing others by aiding in unrighteous suits, or for the purpose of
gambling in litigation, or to be so extortionate or unconscionable as to be
inequitable against the party" it should be void. 120 This rule foreshadows
the adoption of a case by case analysis to determine the validity of a
contract based on public policy reasons. The probable reason that it is
113. Seeid.
114. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-62-101 (Michie 1987) (entitled "Survival and Abatement of
Actions").
115. See Southern Farm, 454 S.W.2d at 72.
116. Seeid. at71.
117. 28 P. 11, 12 (Or. 1891) ("The solution of this question depends upon how far the ancient
doctrine of champerty and maintenance is to be recognized in this state.").
118. Id.at 13.
119. See id. (stating that "the purchase of a right, which is the subject-matter of a pending
lawsuit.., is not unlawful, unless it is made for the mere purpose or desire of perpetuating strife
and litigation").
120. Id.
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forgotten at the turn of the century by subsequent decisions is most
likely a result of the intent element of the test. It is incredibly difficult to
determine why someone intended to support another in litigation.
Furthermore, the rule is couched in terms that echo the romantic notion
of lawyering, where lawyers would perform their trade in return for
guaranteed payment. 12

Some twenty-two years later the Oregon Supreme Court again
revisited the issue of assignability of torts; this time in conjunction with
an action for fraud. In Sperry v. Stennick, the court announced:
[t]he rule is nearly universal that tortious acts of a party causing
damages to another creates a right of action which abates with the
death of the person sustaining the injury and therefore cannot be
transferred so as to confer upon
the assignee authority to maintain a
22
suit for the wrong inflicted.
This is an unequivocal adoption of the survivability test without
even referencing the Brown case and its holding that survivability is not
the correct measure; rather, it should be an inquiry into the public policy
effects of the assignment. 23 The Sperry court then reveals why this rule
is so attractive; it is a bright line test that will permit the assignment of
injuries to property, but will serve as a blanket prohibition against
assignment of a "wrong committed upon a person."' 124 The court goes on
to give a partial non-exclusive list of such torts. 125 The court opinion
then goes on to state that claims for damage to property should be
assignable, because they survive. 26 It is easy to see through this logic
and conclude that the court knows what types of claims it wants to be
assignable. The distinction of assignable versus un-assignable is
generally the same as the distinction that existed at the time
differentiating survivable and non-survivable claims. The Sperry court
therefore instituted the traditional survivability equals assignment test in
27
Oregon.

121. See Radin, supra note 26, at 69-70 (stating that the contingent fee arrangement lowered
the dignity of the Bar and that a lawyer's fee was to be a definite condition prior to litigation).
122. 129 P. 130, 132 (Or. 1913).
123. Brown, 28 P. at 13.
124. Sperry, 129 P. at 132.
125. Id. ("A wrong committed upon a person resulting in damages by reason of assault and
battery, breach of promise of marriage, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, slander,
etc.... [does] not survive... and hence... cannot be assigned ....).
126. Id. at 132. ("A tortious act causing damages to property, or an act of negligence producing
an injury to a person generally, creates a cause of action that survives and is therefore assignable.").

127. See id.
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Subsequently, the Oregon Supreme Court alluded that the real
differentiation of concern is damage to property versus damage to the
person. In Johnson v. Bergstrom, the court stated "[t]he reasons of policy
against the assignment of personal injury claims have little relevance
with respect to property damage claims.' 28 This statement also drives at
the heart of the issue by suggesting that Oregon is really concerned with
the public policy implication of assignment, not the arbitrary rule of
survivability.
Recently, in 2001, the Court of Appeals of Oregon in Gregory v.
Lovien surveyed the evolution of assignability of tort in the context of a
legal malpractice assignment. 2 9 The court traced the evolution from the
Sperry decision, which moved from the traditional rule to the more
liberal position where the inquiry is "whether the public policy concerns
that the rule against assignments was intended to prevent were
present."'130 There is another telling change in the law that the court
considers a change in the survivability statute. The court points out that
in 1969 the legislature changed the survivability statute to include all
causes of action.131 This of course had the effect of rendering the
survivability rule meaningless, so if the court wanted to continue
enforcing some ban on the assignment of claims it had to develop a new
standard or finally embrace the rule against assignability to be one
standing upon public policy considerations.
4.

The State Continues To Enforce A Substantial Champerty Or
Maintenance Or Anti-Assignment Prohibition Based On
Champerty/Maintenance
There are two states that represent this position with each having a
slightly different statutory maintenance provision. Illinois' statute is
almost identical to the Blackstone definition. Georgia does not define
champerty or maintenance in the statute but includes
them as part of list
32
policy.'
public
contravene
that
contracts
under
Illinois has codified maintenance in chapter 720 section 5/32-12 of
the Illinois Compiled Statutes. The statute is almost a wholesale
adoption of Blackstone's definition. The only real difference is that

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Johnson v. Bergstrom, 587 P.2d 71, 73 (Or. 1978).
Gregory v. Lovlien, 26 P.3d 180, 181-82 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 182.
Id. at n.3.
See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
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Illinois includes the phrase: "with a view to promote litigation."'1 33 This
implies that action of the maintainer must be done with intent to foster
frivolous litigation. This is the language that the court would use to limit
the scope of the statute.
The key case to understanding the development of the related
doctrines champerty and maintenance in Illinois is North Chicago Street
Railroad Co. v. Ackley, where the court rejected the survivability test
and instead adopted a "broader inquiry" consisting of (i) avoiding
maintenance and (ii) all assignments are void unless the assignor has
possession or potential possession of the object of assignment. 134 The
first part of the inquiry is a clear adoption of maintenance. However the
court does recognize that the doctrine is not as robustly applied as it
with the
once was. 135 The second part of the test has little relevance
136
conception that property today can include intangibles.
The legislature in Illinois has defined what maintenance is and how
it is to be applied. 137 However, there has been no decision citing to the
latest incarnation of the statute. 138 The majority of the legal activity
surrounding maintenance occurred during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. 139 For the purpose of the inquiry at hand, however,
the prohibition contained in the statute appears to have changed little
since the time of Blackstone.
Georgia, on the other hand, does not have a specific maintenance or
champerty statute. Instead, it has a general statute detailing types of
contracts that are void for violating public policy. 140 The leading case on

133. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-12 (West 2004) (entitled "Maintenance").
If a person officiously intermeddles in an action that in no way belongs to or concerns
that person, by maintaining or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to
prosecute or defend the action, with a view to promote litigation, he or she is guilty of
maintenance and upon conviction shall be fined and punished as in cases of common
barratry. It is not maintenance for a person to maintain the action of his or her relative or
servant, or a poor person out of charity.
Id.(emphasis added).
1897).
134. 49 N.E. 222, 226 (I11.
135. Id. ("This reason has in modem times lost much, but not the whole, of its force.").
136. Id. For the definition of "property," see, for example, MiCH. COMP. LAWS. § 752.793(1)
(2005) ("'Property' includes... intellectual property, computer data,... restricted personal
information, or any other tangible or intangible item of value.").
137. See supranote 133 and accompanying text.
138. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/32-12 (West 2004) (containing no citing cases).
139. See id.
140. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2 (entitled "Contracts contravening public policy generally"). "A
contract which is against the policy of the law cannot be enforced. Contracts deemed contrary to
public policy include but are not limited to ...(5) Contracts of maintenance or champerty." Id. at
§ 13-8-2(a).
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the meaning of the statute is Sapp v. Davids, where the court decided to
take the definition from the "common law, or statute law of England
before the revolution."' 14 1 The court cites to an earlier case where it had
adopted the Blackstone definition. 42 With this definition in tow the
court arrives at the conclusion that the contract in controversy in Sapp is
void because it is champertous 1 43 The statute and interpretation by the
Georgia Supreme Court in Sapp facially suggests that champerty and
maintenance are in full effect in the state. There has been no abridgment
of the doctrines by any court, leaving the state in the same position as
Illinois. However, there does not appear to have been a case, invalidating
a contract for champertous reasons, since Sapp.
The following section divides the current tort system into two
components, which details the incentives and choices parties currently
have and the policy goals that are promoted by the system. This provides
a baseline by which to measure the effects of the market system in later
sections.
III.

MICRO-TORT AND MACRO-TORT DISTILLATION OF THE AMERICAN
TORT SYSTEM

The tort system in America serves several different functions. One
of the main functions is to carry out public policy ends, including but not
limited to: compensation, deterrence, and restitution. In order to be able
to effectively trace out the working and effect of a market on the system,
a brief analysis of the current system is required.
The tort system can be broken down into two components. The
"micro-tort" component which includes the relationships among
individuals, with special focus on the plaintiff and defendant. The
"macro-tort" component is made up of the societal concerns of the
system, for example general deterrence. Examining the current system
from these two vantage points will reveal a landscape with fertile
opportunities for the introduction of pareto efficiency through the
application of market principles.

141. 168 S.E. 62, 64 (Ga. 1933).
142. Id. ("It is the unlawful maintenance of a suit in consideration of a bargain to have a part of
the thing in dispute, or some profit out of it, and the promise to pay the expenses or costs, seems to
be essential to constitute it.").
143. Id.
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The Micro-Tort Component

The micro-tort component is the aspect of the system that deals
with the parties directly involved with tort litigation. Each of these
parties has their own set of priorities and incentives to undertake actions
and behaviors seeking to maximize their award, or minimize their
exposure to liability. The two obvious parties required in any tort action
are the victim, traditionally known as the plaintiff, and the tort-feasor,
traditionally known as the defendant.
The existence and importance of the micro-tort aspect of tort law is
primarily responsible for the characterization that "[iliability in tort is
based upon the relations of person with others .... 144 This
characterization can be classified as the traditional model. It views the
parties as being personally related to each other as a result of the action
of the defendant and the effect of that action on the plaintiff. The
extreme focus on the individuals involved, as discussed above, is one of
the reasons often referred to for not permitting the assignment of a

claim. 145

46

1
Tort law is "directed toward the compensation of individuals"
and this is the central focus of the micro-tort aspect of the system. The
plaintiff, in any action is seeking to redress an injury caused by the
defendant. This simple concept is of primal importance to tort law. The
other aspect of the above statement is that the compensation comes from
some other single or unitary entity, meaning if a plaintiff cannot collect
from society at large he or she must be able to name a defendant. 147 The
compensation goal is the area that naturally creates most tension
between the actors. Assuming all actors are to be wealth maximizing
entities, the plaintiff will look to get the highest award possible, whereas
the defendant will seek to minimize his liability.
A useful analogy can be drawn to the regular competitive
marketplace. In such a scenario, a buyer of a widget will seek to
purchase the widget for the lowest price; whereas the seller will seek to

144. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 1 (5th ed. 1984).
145. See Patrick T. Morgan, Unbundling Our Tort Rights: Assignability for PersonalInjury
and Wrongful Death Claims, 66 Mo. L. REv. 683, 686 (2001) (detailing the legal orthodoxy that

personal injury rights are unassignable because they are personal rights).
146. KEETON ET AL., supra note 144, at § 1.
147. Arguably when a private party sues the government he is collecting from society at large,
however the wrong was not done unto him because of society at large, rather it is a result of tortious
conduct of government as unitary entity. Therefore the tort action should be conceptualized as
Plaintiff v. Government, not Plaintiff v. Society At Large represented by the Government.
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sell his widget at the highest price. 148 Assuming both parties to be wealth
maximizing entities, there exists an inherent tension between buyer and
seller over the price of the widget. In the marketplace, this tension
coupled with other factors produces desirable results. If one substitutes
defendant for buyer and plaintiff for seller and the legal system for the
marketplace, the same tension is observed. Yet, it is curious that the
marketplace has developed self-resolving mechanisms in response to this
tension, whereas the tort system has not.
This tension locks the parties into a zero-sum game as individuals.
The gain of the plaintiff is the loss of the defendant, the converse also
holds true, any gain made by the defendant by averting liability is a loss
suffered by the plaintiff. But this simple analysis is not the whole story
from either perspective. The eventual resolution of a tort claim still has
associated transaction costs as a result of the complicated nature of the
system and its inherent risk. Unlike the market analysis above where
over time buyers and sellers have had the opportunity to develop
mechanisms that reduce the costs of making the transaction, for example
standardized methods of payment, universal and divisible currency, and
standard behavior. 149 The tort system has not yet developed as
sophisticated tools for self-resolution. The proposal presented in this
Note would further the tort system's development.
One commentator has pointed out that the adversarial nature of the
system and its dependence on the principles of negligence is inherently
high in transactions costs because negligence is almost always
litigated. 50 This highlights another key difference between the efficient
widget market discussed above and the inefficient tort litigation system,
namely, the forced relationship of the parties. In the widget market the
seller or buyer can walk away at any given time and seek out another
buyer or seller. The tort system does not allow for such an occurrence.
The plaintiff who wants to get the most compensation has only one
source from which to get it, the defendant. Recall, that the plaintiff is in
fact the seller in the tort market, he is the one holding the debt or the
good, and is seeking to get the most value for the claim.

148. In this scenario, the seller has only one unit to sell; therefore, his profit maximizing point
is equal to the highest possible price. If he had more than one unit his profit maximizing point might
be lower than the price he would charge for a single unit.
149. An example of standard behavior would be shopping around to look for the best price or
the right product, or, understanding that purchasing is an exchange in which both parties gain
something.
150.

JOHN G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 19 (1988).
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In his quest to be compensated the plaintiff may involve several
other parties, the most recognized is the lawyer. The lawyer brings his
considerable and specialized knowledge of the workings of the legal
system to benefit his client, in the same way a doctor brings his
specialized knowledge of the human body to help the client maximize
his health. It is important to spell out in detail what benefit the lawyer is
bringing to his client. It must be that some benefit is derived from a
lawyer; otherwise, lawyering would be a dying profession.
The largest benefit that a lawyer provides is information: he is able
to assess and coalesce the facts of a case and figure out the legal strength
of the client's position; develop strategies to improve the client's
chances of increasing his welfare; and implement one or more of these
strategies on behalf of the client. These three functions have two
dependent effects, they reduce risk, which in turn increases the
probability of making a wealth maximizing decision.
The primary parties (plaintiff and defendant) may also involve
insurance companies in their dispute, this generally occurs before the
tort. These companies function much to the same effect as a lawyer but
in a different capacity. They provide safety from risk in the event of a
and certain rights, which are
suit, in return for premium payments
51
Note.1
this
of
scope
the
outside
Turning to the defendant, he is in a monopsonist position, the lone
buyer of the good, this creates a market distortion. The defendant is able
to purchase the tort at lower than market cost 52 through an out of court
settlement, or he can litigate the claim against him. If he litigates there
are two simultaneous scenarios, on the one hand, he can try to argue that
in fact the debt held by the plaintiff is not his or is defective, this is
denying liability. Or, he can argue that the claim (amount of the debt) is
lower than what the plaintiff maintains, this in effect turns the court and
jury into price arbitrators. The two litigation scenarios are not mutually
exclusive, many if not most defendants argue them simultaneously and
in conjunction with each other.
Aside from being in a privileged position to redeem the tort, the
defendant also has other advantages over the plaintiff. He has not
suffered any injury, therefore his actual costs do not start to accrue from
the moment of injury, rather they start to accrue only from the moment
151. The other rights may include things like subrogation and obligations to notify the
insurance company.
152. In this case, market cost is equivalent to the amount of a jury award because as will be
discussed later, what a jury is willing to give is the actual cost of a tort or the value of the debt held
by the plaintiff.
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he incurs expense to increase his chances of fending off a successful
claim by the plaintiff. This lack of injury allows the defendant to exert
pressure on the plaintiff by simply delaying the litigation; this will
increase the plaintiffs costs. This makes the plaintiff more susceptible to
accepting a settlement, which would be less than what a jury may award
or in the extreme case, it is possible that the defendant might raise the
plaintiff's costs so high that he may abandon all attempts to collect.
When litigation is viewed as a transaction between the two parties it
becomes evident that the defendant is in a better starting position than
the plaintiff. He can leverage time and cost, in order to pressure the
plaintiff into accepting less than what a jury award would give him.
Theoretically the jury award should be equal to the cost of the injury.
Therefore by accepting less, the plaintiff is getting less than the cost of
the injury and the defendant is being under-deterred.
B. The Macro-Tort Component
The macro-tort aspect of the system encompasses all of the societal
concerns that weigh into the decision-making process. This part of the
system is generally observed in two scenarios: when either litigant is
looking to support their position by appealing to "public policy" or when
the court/jury decides a case with an eye towards affecting the behavior
of society at large.
The first scenario is really a response by the litigants to the way
courts and juries were deciding cases and their jurisprudential views. As
judges have increasingly viewed themselves as "social engineers who
balanced the claims of competing interests on behalf of the public
good,, 153 lawyers realized that their success in litigation would
necessitate the inclusion of public policy based arguments.
Cardozo described the role of a judge as "fashion[ing] law for the
litigants before him. In fashioning it for them, he will be fashioning it for
others." 15 4 This embodies the interaction and inherent possibility for
tension between the micro-tort and macro-tort parts of the system.
Sometimes the just result between parties will not serve the public at
large, the macro-tort part of the system is the consideration given to
society at large even though they have no exclusive representative
among the parties before the court.
This concept of macro-tort can be seen most readily when courts
cite general deterrence as ratio decidendi. In Lauer v. City of New York
153.
154.

G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 106 (2003).
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 21 (1921).
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the court was considering whether a person could recover against the
City of New York for the negligence of a city employee. 55 The dissent
highlights the existence of the macro-tort concept and the tension that
can occur in cases between the micro and macro elements of the system.
The dissent faults the majority for not "balancing several policy
considerations" instead of just considering "compensation for the victim
and general deterrence .... The dissent further faults the majority's
reasoning for suggesting that liability in this case would contravene
public policy.1 57 In essence the case became about weighing the needs of

society at large. The majority decided that the public is better served by
not imposing liability, because the public's concerns and the plaintiffs
concerns are at odds with each other.1 58 The dissent suggests the
and society's are harmonious and
opposite, that the plaintiffs concern
159
dictate the possibility of liability.

Another New York Court of Appeals decision can serve as an
example of the large effect the macro-tort aspect of the system has on
the system as a whole. In De Angelis v. Lutheran Med Ctr. the court had

to decide whether children could bring a suit for loss of consortium,
when one of their parents had been seriously disabled. 60 Although the
loss suffered was indeed real, the court decided that no cause of action
existed for the children.' 61 As the sole reason for its decision, the court
held:
A line must be drawn between the competing policy considerations of
providing a remedy to everyone who is injured and of extending
exposure to tort liability almost without limit. It is always tempting,
especially when symmetry and sympathy would so seem to be best
served, to impose new duties, and, concomitantly, liabilities,
regardless of the economic and social burden. But, absent legislative

155.

Lauer v. City of New York, 733 N.E.2d 184, 186 (N.Y. 2000).

156. Id. at 195 (Smith, J. dissenting).
157.

Id. (Smith, J.dissenting).

158. Id.at 189. "[Iln order for plaintiff's claim... to be successful, [the court] would have to
impose a new duty on the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, which.., would run to members
of the public who may become subjects of a criminal investigation...." Id. This would
consequently give the general public grounds to sue, which would be detrimental to the work of the
medical examiner. Id.
159. Id. at 195 (Smith, J. dissenting) ("On the contrary, liability under these circumstances
would affirm the reasonable expectations of both the parties and society.").
160.

449 N.E.2d 406, 407 (N.Y. 1983).

161. Id.at4O7.
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intervention, the fixing of the
162 "orbit" of duty, as here, in the end is the
responsibility of the courts.
The court's sole reason stated for deciding that there was no duty, and
consequently no primafacie case, was because the "economic and social
burden" dictated against it. 163 This case is an example of when the
macro-tort considerations trumped the micro-tort objective of
compensation for a wrong.
Consequently, from the above analysis, the incorporation of a
system that could bring the macro-tort and micro-tort considerations into
harmony would be a more just system for all parties involved. One such
mechanism was recognized by Adam Smith to accomplish just such a
result, "the automatic equilibrating mechanism of the competitive
market."164
The following section examines the basis for formation of the
markets. It will also demonstrate the advantages the market will have on
the tort system from the micro-tort perspective.
IV.

THE TORT CLAIMS MARKET: ADVANTAGES AND ITS MICRO-TORT
IMPLICATIONS

A market is a mechanism where buyers and sellers of goods come
together in order to exchange their wares. A market in legal claims is
one where "bundles of rights"' 65 are exchanged for money.166 Before

sketching how such a market would function, it is important to establish
the key provision of all market operations. A person will undertake to
sell something only if they believe the sale to be to his or her benefit,
concurrently, a person will only buy something if he or she believes the
purchase to be to his or her benefit. 167 The market in claims, as it is
contemplated, is a voluntary market. No person is forced to sell and no
person is forced to buy; they each will transact only if they both see
value in the transaction. It is worth reiteration that the market as
envisioned by this Note is a completely voluntary one, having no effect
on substantive tort law or on the options plaintiffs and defendants have
to conduct themselves in the traditional manner.
162. Id. at 407-08 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 408.
164.

MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 57 (5th ed. 1996).

165. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. For the purposes of this note, the term "bundles
of rights" encompasses everything included in the definition of "claim," including, but not limited
to, the right to recover and standing to sue. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
166. See Choharis, supra note 16, at 443.
167. See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 1,at 13.
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The proposed market in claims will consist of two general
commodities: current claims and future-contingent claims. No further
breakdown beyond this will be discussed, because it should be up to the
individual participants involved in the market to decide whether or not a
certain kind of claim is marketable. Therefore there will be no analysis
of specific causes of action. This section will deal first with the general
reasons for a market, then the current claims market, and finally the
future-contingent claims market.
A.

Formationand Basis of the Current Claims Market

The reason a market in claims will exist is because people have
different relative abilities to bear risk. 168 Several factors figure into a
party's willingness to bear risk, primarily the wealth of the party.169
Torts and personal injury present a unique opportunity, because the risk
of litigation is thrust upon unwilling parties. This is the opposite of a
contractual relation, where the risk is assumed willingly. Therefore, the
market is a clearinghouse where people who want to get rid of their risk
can sell it to those who want to assume it.
The reason anyone will want to purchase risk is because at its core,
risk is an uncertain opportunity to make money. People who want to sell
it do not have the means or desire to fully exploit the risk. The potential
for profit arises from the differential between the price paid to the seller
and the potential payout. This difference represents a risk premium. It is
the price paid by the buyer of certainty (seller of risk) to the seller of
certainty (buyer of risk).
From an economic perspective, the sale of a tort is possible because
of the differences between the risk factors of the individuals involved
and the resulting certainty equivalent generated. A certainty equivalent is
the "minimum amount of money" a person "would rather have for
certain instead of taking some risk." 170 In essence this can be seen as the
minimum value a plaintiff will accept in order to forego the risk of
litigation and the possibility of winning. This will generally occur when
the victim-seller is a risk averse individual, meaning that they value
certainty more than risk, and the buyer is at a minimum, risk neutral. The
parties will also transact if there is a differential in what each party
expects value of the claim to be post litigation. If the victim believes the
168. Ari Dobner,Litigation ForSale, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1529, 1531-32 (1996).
169. See id. at 1532.
(2003),
available
Risk
and
Uncertainty
Mike
Shor,
170. See
http://www.gametheory.net/Mike/applets/Risk/.
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value of the claim to be lower then what the buyer believes, than the
parties will have an opportunity to contract, with each party being better
off without affecting the defendant's rights or opportunities.
While the market will standardize the expected values of some
claims it will be unable to do so with all claims, because rarely are two
tort cases identical much the same way no two stock offerings are
identical. Each tort has a specific set of facts, applicable laws, and
parties, just like each company offering stock has its specific business
area, structure, and personnel. All of these factors, in both cases, will
affect the price evaluations of a claim or stock offering.
1. The Micro-Tort Impact of the Primary Market
Market functioning is most easily understood by applying the
mechanism to a set of facts. This section will analyze the market from
the perspective of the individuals involved, their choices, and how this
affects their welfare. The legal analysis of this section will be conducted
by examining the relationship and interaction of five principal parties:
Paul the victim, seller, and original plaintiff, David the tortfeasor,
defendant, and interested buyer; Ivan the uninterested buyer of the
victim's (Paul's) claim; Larry, the uninterested buyer of the tortfeasor's
(David) defense; and Sam the secondary market buyer of claims.
Suppose, Paul is injured by David's conduct resulting in personal
injuries. Normally, Paul would be in line to receive economic damages
for the medical expenses and income lost during his time out of work.
Also Paul may be able to collect compensation for the pain and suffering
caused by his injuries.
Under the traditional tort system Paul would have two options: he
can settle with David for an agreed upon price avoiding the cost of
litigation; or he can launch litigation and begin to invest in the process,
hoping that it will pay off and he will recover enough to compensate him
and cover the costs of litigating. If Paul decides to litigate then he is
taking all the risk of procuring compensation. Normally he can shift up
to a third of that risk to his lawyer, with the hope that his lawyer's
specialized knowledge will reduce the risk, thereby increasing his
chance of success.
Suppose that Ivan approaches Paul and proposes that Paul assign to
him the claim he has against David. In return Ivan promises to pay him
the present value of the expected jury award (Pv) less a discount for
assumed risk (Ra), equaling Paul's certainty equivalent (CE). In
mathematical terms the price (P) of a suit equals (Pv-Ra) which is
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equal to Paul's (CE). With this option in hand Paul's realm of options
changes dramatically.
If Paul decides to negotiate with David and attempt settlement, he is
not in a position to be strong-armed. Paul can always walk away from
the settlement negotiations without his sole recourse being litigation.
This immediate removal of David's monopsonist position will increase
the amount that David is willing to pay to purchase the claim if indeed
he wants to avoid litigation. Therefore Paul is better off by the simple
presence of Ivan, even if Paul does not sell him anything. David has
suffered a small setback in position, because he is no longer a
monopsonist, but this is not terribly detrimental to him, he is being
forced to pay closer to the actual cost of the injury, 171 and as discussed
infra, his gains offset this small setback. However, from a societal point
of view, as discussed supra, the purpose of the tort system is to
compensate the victim for the damage done,' 7 2 and therefore the market
in this case has brought the level of compensation closer to the cost of
injury without an increase in litigation.
David's options have not been reduced or impinged in anyway. As
a useful analogy to David's change in position, consider the reasons
behind the anti-trust legislation, the presence of a monopoly entity is
inevitably bad for all parties involved except the monopolist. David,
until the arrival of Ivan's proposal and the corresponding introduction of
competition into the system, occupied the position of the only legal
buyer of the claim. David, as the monopsonist was in a position of
excessive power. Further, any harm David faces is outweighed by some
other benefits that the system provides to David which are detailed later,
and the inferences that David can make from the interaction between
Paul and Ivan. Primarily David gets the benefit of an independent third
party assessment of the strength of Paul's claim. David is able to deduce
the strength without even knowing what the price offered was, if Ivan is
willing to buy then he believes that he can make a profit, this should
cause David to worry and believe that the claim has some merit.
Paul's next option would be to launch litigation and attempt to
collect through the court system. The introduction of Ivan's proposal has
done nothing to affect this decision. Paul can turn down Ivan and
proceed as he normally would. There has been no prejudice to his

171. Actual cost of an injury means the amount that a jury would determine to be the value of
the claim.
172. See KEETON, supra note 144, at 5.
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position, nor has David's ability to defend himself been impinged by the
insertion of Ivan into the situation.
Finally, Paul can sell his claim to Ivan. In that case Paul receives
certain and guaranteed compensation. He has also effectively sold all of
his risk. He has paid a premium to get rid of his risk, but that choice is of
his own free will, and he has decided that the risk of getting nothing is
higher then the difference between the amount a jury will award less
than the price Ivan offers.
Switching focus from Paul to Ivan, Ivan steps into the shoes of Paul
as the one directing the course of the proceedings. His options include
settling with David, pursing litigation, or in turn selling the claim to
another party. These are substantially the same choices that Paul faced.
Ivan could settle with David and the analysis will be the same
except that now there is a risk neutral party dictating the terms of
litigation. A risk neutral party values each dollar equally, 73 instead of at
a discount like a risk averse party. Therefore a risk neutral person will
have a higher certainty equivalent, meaning that Ivan will require a
higher amount to settle because he is more willing to bear risk.
Since Ivan does not have the worries that Paul had, for example
how he was going to make any money to feed his family, pay the rent, or
recoup lost income,' 74 he is able to make a purely economically
motivated choice. Ivan's lack of personal motivation for vengeance
reduces transaction costs, because the legal system is used simply as a
tool to an end, which is the settlement of the outstanding debt or
obligation. The possibility that a lawsuit could be used as a means for
vengeance is eliminated or substantially reduced in cases where the
victim has sold his or her claim. As a byproduct of the sale, the
possibility of vengeance-based, irrational decision making is also
reduced. In essence, Ivan is more of a profit maximizer than Paul
because of his lack of a psychological need to extract any sort of
revenge. 75 Ivan therefore can compare the176true value of the settlement
with the expected net outcome of litigation.
Ivan could also choose to litigate, thereby assuming all the rights
and responsibilities of a plaintiff. He would be able to conduct
discovery, deposition, hearings, and a trial. However, there are several
advantages of having Ivan litigate over Paul. Ivan's willing investment
173. See Shor, supra note 170.
174. See Choharis, supra note 16, at 480.
175. Seeid. at483.
176. Teal E. Luthy, Comment, Assigning Common Law Claims for Fraud,65 U. CHI. L. REV.
1001, 1016 (1998).
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in the claim indicates that he made sure to have a good legal team and
available resources in order to conduct the litigation if need be. He will
evaluate the potential outcome of litigation when he is deciding whether
to make an offer for the claim. His rational choice to become involved in
the claim suggests that he believes that there is a certain amount of
money that the claim is worth and upon reaching that amount he will sell
the claim.
This process will reduce litigation because there will be a certain
point where Ivan will forego the risk of litigation for a certain amount of
money, the same way that Paul did. The key difference is that Ivan has a
higher threshold for risk; he lacks the non-economical factors such as the
actual physical injury and the possibly associated emotional trauma. Ivan
also lacks the economical issues that Paul has, he does not lack cash in
order to withstand the rigors of litigation with a well-heeled David. This
parity in resources may lower David's incentive to try and win the case
by delay.' 77
Ivan has another possible option that he can pursue: he can sell his
claim to Sam. Sam represents the existence of a secondary market. His
presence provides the same advantages for Ivan that Ivan's presence
provided for Paul. Namely, Sam provides Ivan the ability to liquidate his
position in the claim without extinguishing the claim by selling it to
David. This option is discussed in further detail in the following section.
David has several options as well. He can attempt to purchase the
claim from Paul or Ivan. Of course, he is now competing for the claim so
the price may be higher. However, there is a flip side to the introduction
of competition to the system that benefits David. The presence of other
players, or lack thereof, is a signal to him of independent third-party
valuations of the strength of the claim. If he sees strong competition for
the claim he can infer that independent third parties believe that there is
a reasonable chance for success. Further, he may be able to deduce that
Paul is valuing the claim too low and therefore if he were to raise his
settlement offer a bit more he might be able to settle the claim and avoid
litigation. David's uncertainty has been reduced because of the presence
of the price system and the information contained in a commodities
price. Therefore, David is better off by Paul having access to the market
system.
David may also benefit from Ivan's purchase, because Ivan may be
more receptive to finding a middle ground in settlement negotiations.

177.

See Choharis, supranote 16, at 489.
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Ivan, as a rational economic actor, is satiated by adjustment of pecuniary
rewards during the settlement phase of the negotiation.
David may choose to litigate and defend against Ivan or Paul. This
option has not been abridged or effected in any substantive way by the
introduction of the market. David can still rely on all the applicable laws
that were available to him before Ivan became involved. His position is
no worse off then under the current tort system.
Finally, David has one other interesting option that was unavailable
to him under the current system: he can assign his liability. If Paul is
allowed to sell the right to recover on the debt, David should be allowed
to assign the obligation to pay the debt. This transaction would look
something like the following: David approaches Larry and offers him an
amount to take on the obligation to pay the debt. In essence this means
incurring the risk of liability for the value of the claim. This transaction
is possible for the same reasons that Paul and Ivan choose to transact,
namely that there is a difference in the parties relative tolerance for risk.
This proposition also eliminates the problem of the plaintiffs (the
party with ownership rights to the debt) ability to set the minimum price
that the defendant must pay in order to avoid litigation. If David is able
to pay Larry less than he would have had to pay Paul, Ivan, or Sam then
he can extricate himself from the situation and the party willing to bear
to the risk of liability may do so. Paul, Ivan, and Sam are indifferent to
this situation.
David has not escaped unscathed from the tort he has committed, as
he has had to pay Larry enough money to induce him from a position of
certainty into a gambling position. Although in some cases Larry may
lose and in that case David may have paid less then what the tort was
worth, Paul, Ivan or Sam has been fully compensated. This will even out
on a societal level because there will be situations where Larry is the
winner and no liability is found or he is able to execute a settlement for
less then what David paid him, in that case David has overpaid.
The other key factor to consider is that Larry is not going to take a
very small amount from David in a case where the chances of loss at
litigation or the cost of settlement are going to be very high. The weaker
David's defense, the more money it will take to induce Larry to take on
the risk.
Shifting to Larry's perspective, he like Ivan and Sam, has all of the
choices and options that were available to David. But because Larry is
willing to bear risk that David had no choice but to bear, he is better able
to assess the available offers and options. Furthermore, Larry is also
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emotionally detached from the actual tort, and therefore he is more likely
making an economically rational decision.
Finally, Sam presents an interesting scenario. If he comes to own
both Paul's rights to sue (Paul's claim) and David's right to defend
(David's claim), then the case has been effectively settled. In this
scenario the market has settled the lawsuit through a series of voluntary
transactions that exploit the differences in relative ability to bear risk. In
essence, the market and the price mechanism by which it operates, has
acted as a mediator, between seller and buyer, just as it does with any
other commodity. In theory this self-settling transaction can occur
without the victim and tortfeasor ever engaging in negotiations.
The self settlement scenario might unfold as follows: Paul sells to
Ivan who sells to Sam. Concurrently, David pays Larry who then pays
Sam. If the pricing works out, then what Larry is willing to pay may be
more than what Ivan is asking for, in such a case Sam has the
opportunity to make the difference between his price to take on the
liability from Larry (David's liability) and the price Ivan asks to sell the
claim (Paul's claim). If this occurs, legally Sam would own the right to
sue himself. Yet examining the results, each and every person was paid
in accordance with the level of risk they were willing to bear. This, of
course, is only a possibility and not a certainty in every case.
Financially, it only works out if the amount that the person holding the
right to defend (the right to be liable) is higher than the amount of the
claim itself.
From the micro-tort perspective the market system creates
opportunities and options for all parties without compromising the basic
goal of compensating the victim. It has the potential to remove emotion
from decisions that deserve to be made in a rational manner, thereby
reducing the use of the tort system for vengeance. The market also
provides valuable information feedback to all parties through the price
mechanism. This increase in information reduces uncertainty. With
uncertainty being reduced, parties are more confident in their decisions
and are able to reduce the transaction costs associated with trying to
insulate themselves from uncertainty.
2. The Micro-Tort Impact of the Secondary Market
The secondary market is where primary purchasers sell to
secondary purchasers. From the hypothetical used above, Ivan and Larry
would be primary purchasers, whereas Sam would be a secondary
purchaser. The purpose of the secondary market is to provide the
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primary purchaser with liquidity.'78 The increased liquidity will allow
for greater risk-sharing and distribution. It will 79also provide for the
parties involved in the market to hedge their risks.
Liquidity itself is a certainty-generating concept. If an investor is
locked into an investment, he runs the risk that over time there will be an
effect on the investment by changing market conditions and he also
suffers an opportunity cost by not being able to realize a fungible
return. 80 In essence, the longer a purchaser of a good has to hold onto
the good before realizing a return, the more risk he is incurring.181 Since
an increase in risk will raise the certainty equivalent of the party
assuming the risk, the product associated with the risk becomes more
expensive.1 82 This makes people less inclined to participate in the
market, which therefore reduces the number of low transaction cost
exchanges.
Transaction costs are reduced by the existence of the market on an
individual level in several ways, the most prominent being the
downward pressure on the cost of legal services. A buyer of a tort will
have an incentive to keep his costs as low as possible because the higher
his costs, the lower the profit margin. His rational decision to become
involved with the claim also suggests that he will choose legal services
that fit the risk. Accordingly, since the purchaser has a higher tolerance
for risk he or she will spend relatively less resources mitigating the risk
in an attempt to increase his or her profits. Since the majority of costs
involved in any tort action are the legal costs, any system that can reduce
these costs is providing both an individual and societal benefit by
paid out and amount received closer to the actual
bringing the amount
183
cost of the tort.

This downward pressure on legal costs will be especially noticeable
if institutional investors develop economies of scale. They will be able to
assemble litigation teams at fixed or almost fixed prices, further
reducing transaction costs. These investors will be able to avoid

178. See id. at 500.
179. If a party or suit is not sold by either party, then none of the analysis of this paper is
relevant as it will not be subject to benefits that the market bestows.
180. See Choharis, supra note 16, at 503.

181. Seeid.
182. Id.
183. See FLEMING, supra note 150, at 19, 19 & n.73. (detailing a study whereby the combined
attorney's fees in an average settlement are approximately equal to 61.3% of the total value of the
settlement). When a case was litigated the combined attorney costs were approximately equal to
62.9% of the total award. Id. These amounts are expressed as a percentage of the award, but they are
not subtracted from any payment made to the plaintiff. Id.
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duplicative discovery costs if they have8 4more then one unrelated claim
outstanding against the same defendant.1
This ability to consolidate unrelated claims against a common
defendant also leads to an increased probability for settlement and more
efficient settlement discussions. These bulk purchasers are able to settle
several claims at one time for a lump sum. Lawyers under today's
market are not permitted to conduct such arrangements because of their
fiduciary duties to each client. But the holder of several claims against a
common defendant is able to negotiate one price for all outstanding
claims held. This is more efficient on several levels. First, there are
fewer parties involved, only one on each side with several claims
outstanding, instead of one plaintiff per claim. Second, the singular
control of the decision-making process on each side will lead to the same
efficiencies that are observed in class action cases, which are
administered by a single legal team. Yet this is done without the long
drawn out issues of certification or having several different clients in the
end. This situation allows for the spontaneous formation of plaintiff
classes based on economic efficiency with minimal, if any, judicial
involvement.
In this scenario the incentive on both sides is to settle. The
defendant will want to avoid litigating several different claims, each
with duplicative costs. The purchaser will have the same concern,
because if he can deal with several claims at once, he is able to reduce
his costs which is an automatic increase in his profit margin. Litigating
will mean that all non-joinable, or class actionable claims, must be
treated individually. By allowing people to sell their torts, under the
above scenario, the market has changed the incentive of the parties from
litigation as the highest profit payout to settlement as having a higher
payout.
Under this scenario no party is worse off. Each original victim was
compensated where some would not have been. Therefore, as a class
they are better off. Individually, each was able to move on with his or
her life and none had any option truncated by the new system. The
purchaser is able to make a profit; therefore, the existence of the market
makes him better off automatically. The defendant is able to reduce his
transaction costs because he is dealing with one purchaser instead of
several different individual plaintiffs, and he is able to discharge several
claims in one sitting. This is all made possible because the purchaser
was able to collect these claims easily and efficiently on the secondary
184.

See Choharis, supra note 16, at 486.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss4/11

38

Marcushamer: Selling Your Torts: Creating a Market for Tort Claims and Liabili
2005]

CREA TING A MARKET FOR TORT CLAIMS

market. If this had been done on the primary market, his costs would be
much higher because of its decentralized nature, but it would also be
possible and the analysis would be the same.
The secondary market is of vital importance in another respect:
regulation. 85 Entrance to the secondary market is the logical point from
which to regulate the operation of the entire market. This is due to the
lucrative nature of the secondary market. Most, if not all, primary
purchasers will want to have access to it. Therefore, if guidelines and
regulations are adopted that dictate requirements for sale of a claim1 86 on
the secondary market, the primary purchasers, not wanting to forgo their
access to liquidity, will adhere to the guidelines. This situation is
analogous to the function of the Securities and Exchange Commission
and other market regulating agencies with respect to the stock market
and other capital markets. The issue of regulation is further addressed
infra Part VII.
B. Formation andBasis of Future-ContingentTort Claims Market
The future-contingent claims [hereinafter F-CC] market is made
possible by the same mechanism that allows the current market to
function, namely, the existence of different acceptable values of risk
among individuals. 18 7 Just as in the current claim market, it is the
market's willingness to exploit this difference that will allow for parties
to bargain.' 88 This section will highlight the key differences between the
F-CC market and the current claims market and then examine the F-CC
market itself from the micro-tort perspective.
The key and most obvious difference between the two markets is
that the F-CC market has an added layer of risk. The current claim
market has only one level of risk, the success of litigation. The parties
knew for certain that the tortious injury occurred, and they knew the
injury sustained. Here the market has to make that same assessment, but
it must also assess the likelihood of the injury occurring. Consider the
following diagrams:

185. See id. at 500-01 (noting that since a claim may be traded or resold in a secondary market,
a tort claim investment instrument must satisfy the demands of market, state and federal regulatory
regimes governing markets).
186. Under the definition of "claim" being advanced, "claim" includes both the right to
payment or the right to defend against payment. See supra PartI.
187. Robert Cooter, Liability Rights as Contingent Claims, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 575 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
188. Id.
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The uniqueness of the F-CC market is that the decision to sell is
made before the injury. Therefore, the probability of injury will affect
the profit of each party. Outside of this added concern the actual
functioning of the market will be very similar to the current market. The
options available to each party remain unaffected save one. Paul, our
original victim, has a mutually exclusive choice to make. If he sells an
F-CC he will not be able to sell the claim on the current market.
It is important to note that the types of claims sold are limited
solely by the imagination of the market actors. As examples, people
might limit the time for which the right is valid, or it might be limited to
injuries below a certain monetary threshold, or it could specify what
kinds of damages or injuries are being traded. All of these decisions
would be decided by the individuals who are contracting during
negotiations in a manner most beneficial to them. One commentator has
postulated that a "person might sell the right to recover intangible
losses ... and retain the right to recover tangible losses."' 189 Interesting
scenarios also include the possibility of selling posthumous F-CCs. For
example, one might sell a wrongful death suit, making it no longer part
of the estate.
The other significant possibility is the development of an options
market, where the purchaser would have the right to buy the suit based
on negotiated criteria once the injury occurs. This option is more of a
middle ground between the F-CC and current claim markets. This hybrid
option will allow for the parties to signal their willingness to come to a
bargain and at the same time provide them with an escape from the deal,
if it is no longer in their best interests down the line. This does not harm
the victim because he is paid for the option. But if there is a clause that
allows him to walk away under certain circumstances, or if the buyer
chooses to walk away, then the victim is in the exact same position
where he would be under the traditional system.
The proposal presented here is different from the Sugarman and
O'Connell models. Professor O'Connell's model is designed to operate
as a no-fault insurance scheme, where the victim has his or her entire
pecuniary loss covered. 190 It is limited to insurance companies as key
players, while the proposal of this Note is not limited to the provision of
insurance; rather, market players and forces should be able to decide for
themselves what bargains are in their best interest. The essence of the
189.

Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REv. 383, 384-85

(1989).
190. See O'Connell, supra note 19, at 697 (describing the bargain to be struck as no fault
coverage in return for absolute assignment of claim).
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bargain of O'Connell's proposal is that by giving up the right to sue in
advance, the potential victim receives guaranteed compensation from the
potential injurer if he is injured in a manner so covered by the
contract. 191 Limiting the market to certain participants creates the
possibility for market distortion and reduces the benefits of unfettered
competition. As has been emphasized before, the market system as
proposed here does not affect a victim's current choices under the
traditional system. It is only adding another option, nor does the
proposal here necessarily end in the pre-settlement of tort suits.
Professors Sugarman and Cooter's proposal would limit a seller's
access to the market by allowing only those who are "adequately
insured" against accidents to participate. 92 Further, they envision this
market as functioning primarily as a pre-settlement device, in essence,
allowing the future tortfeasor to buy the claims before they arise thereby
avoiding the hassle of determining liability. 93 Although pre-settlement
is a possibility under the proposal contemplated here, it is not one of the
overarching goals. The proposal here is based on the efficiency of riskshifting and that when people are allowed to shift their risk (either
increase or decrease it) unimpeded, they will do so only when it is in
their best interests. The exact nature of the transaction and the
consideration given in return for a F-CC should be left up to traditional
market forces to determine. The thrust of the argument presented here is
that entities should have the right to engage in such a negotiation and
expect the contract to be binding so long as it meets the traditional
requirements of valid contracts. Therefore, there should be no limitation
on the rights of people to alienate their risks. Thus, the majority of the
regulation needed to ensure that the market is functioning in a fair
manner is done at the intersection between the primary and secondary
markets, just as it is done in the traditional financial markets.
1. Micro-Tort Impact of the Future-Contingent Claim Market
The key premise to the F-CC market is that an unmatured claim is
worth "the probability of the tort times the damages that will be suffered
if the tort occurs."' 9 4 This means that the parties are going to take a risk
on whether the tort will actually occur. The other key premise is the
same one as in the current market, the probability of success in litigation.
191. See COOTER & SUGARMAN, supra note 17, at 183 (discussing Professor O'Connell's
proposals).
192. See id. at 176.
193. See id.
194. See Cooter, supra note 189, at 384.
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The potential victim has reason to sell his tort because he will
receive future compensation today, in return for a contingent right. This
means that his best case scenario as a seller is to have no injury occur
and he keeps the money as profit. Consider the diagrams supra; the
seller in the F-CC market weighs the possibility of loss at trial, against
an injury with some mitigating amount of compensation (the amount of
the sale) but with no legal recourse. This simple proposition has
powerful implications. Assuming the plaintiff to be a profit maximizer,
his strongest incentive is to prevent injury to himself. The traditional tort
system has no such incentive outside of contributory negligence. The
simple sale of the F-CC has already radically changed the way the seller
is going to interact with society by breeding a more cautious person, one
who will avoid unnecessary risk, because he has no post-accident
recourse.
Of course the worst scenario for the seller is one where he sells and
because of the discounting that occurs for the assumption of risk, he is
left with less than the cost of his injuries. Assuming the potential victim
sells an F-CC for $100 that has an expected value after successful
litigation of $500 (after litigation costs), and assuming further, that the
tort system is perfect and only gives compensatory damages for the cost
of the injury then the cost of the injury would also be considered to be
$500. Consider the following payoff matrix for the seller:

Not injured
Injured

Sale

No sale

Successful
Litigation

Unsuccessful
Litigation

100 profit
100
price-

0 profit
N/A

N/A
500

N/A
-500

500 injury
-400 loss

=

loss

=

(award)cost of injury.
500 (cost
of injury) =
No profit!
no loss

The seller is going to weigh the possibility of getting a $100 profit
for selling the F-CC versus the possibility of getting injured. He is also
going to weigh the possibility of a $400 loss versus a $500 loss. Once he
makes the sale, he is no longer concerned with litigation. But he is
concerned with the cost of the injury, because he must bear it
completely. On the flipside, the F-CC is the only way he can make a
profit. Under the tort regime, he is at best going to be put in a position
back to where he was before the tort occurred. He gets no benefit for
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avoiding dangerous behavior. Under the F-CC market he is rewarded for
avoiding injury and profits from this avoidance. Additionally, the F-CC
market even provides a softer landing than the traditional litigation
system. Compare the losing outcome when there is a sale and the seller
suffers an injury, with the situation where there is no sale and a loss at
litigation. When he sells, he has compensation in hand so he suffers less
of a loss than he does if he does not sell and loses at litigation. This
compensation in hand may prove to be a more powerful option than
having legal recourse.
Professor Cooter identified two scenarios where the potential victim
chooses to sell his F-CC: (i) if he already has insurance coverage for the
F-CC that is being sold; or (ii) if the victim believes that the tort will not
happen. 95 The above analysis does not change depending on which of
the two scenarios is posited, and they are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. Nor must they be the only two scenarios although they may
prove to be the most common ones. A person might have insurance and
at the same time believe that the chances of the tort occurring to them
would be small and limited-such a person would be willing to sell.
However, one need not get into a discussion of insurance in order to
understand the options presented to the seller.
Consider the following chart, using the hypothetical from above,
where the cost of the tort is $500 and the price of the F-CC is $100 and
assuming no litigation costs.

BEST CASE

WORST CASE

SALE
Profit (+$100)

NO SALE
Winner at litigation
(net effect is zero)
$500 -$500 = 0
Sale price - Cost of Loser at litigation
injury
($-500)
($100-$500 = -$400) ,

Assume that the seller looks at all the end results and compares the
following: the best scenarios under each and the worst scenarios under
each. Given this, it is perfectly reasonable for a person to come to the
conclusion that they would rather run the risk of making a profit or a
smaller loss with the sale, than take the risk of the largest loss and no
chance for profit.

195.

See id. at 385.
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From the buyer's perspective, they are getting involved in a high
risk, high payout situation. They are taking on the risk of litigation
compounded by the chance of the accident occurring. Because there is
no certainty as to the injury sustained, its severity, and who is the
tortfeasor, the risk of success is quite high. Since the risk is so high, the
price of the F-CC will be relatively lower than a current claim. The
buyer will have the potential for a very high profit if the victim suffers a
tort and he holds the valid rights to it, because the price for the tort may
have been very low. The reason for the higher profit margin in the F-CC
market is the increased risk. This means that many claims will inevitably
turn out to be worthless because no tort occurs.
The preceding sections have dealt with the effects of the market
system on individuals and their choices. However, the tort system has
effects that range beyond the individuals involved. The analysis now
shifts from the individual to the societal. The following section examines
the market system from a macro-tort perspective and the associated
society level effect the system will have on society.
V.

THE MACRO-TORT EFFECTS OF THE MARKET SYSTEM

The market system will have an effect beyond just the individuals
involved with its operation. It will have systemic effects on society at
large just as the tort system does. If these effects are generally positive
then the major public policy hurdles to the market concept are overcome.
The three basic tenents of the current tort system that are affected by the
196
market system are safety/deterrence, compensation, and vengeance.
The first two are either left unaffected or improved by the market
system. The third, vengeance, is reduced, a beneficial development
because vengeance can lead to distorted decision making. Accordingly,
this section will analyze the effects of the Current and F-CC markets on
each of these three aspects.
The original proposition of the market system was that it is pareto
efficient, in that it will not adversely affect any party. The same holds
true for the macro-tort implications of tort law, each one of the three is
either furthered or is left unchanged by the introduction of the market
system.
196. See JAMES A. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 1.02 (1982) ("[t]he law of torts can be
traced back to the blood feuds of primitive societies .... ); see also STUART M. SPIESER ET AL., I
THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 1:3 (2003) (stating that the goals of tort law include
compensation, restitution, punishment, and the declaration of rights). The development of tort law
was motivated by vengeance as is evidenced by the first torts where the victim was compensated by
taking the life of the wrongdoer.
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The Macro-Tort Effects of the Market on Deterrence

The purpose of using tort law as a deterrent is to attempt to
encourage individuals to internalize the costs of all their actions, in
essence, to have them make more socially desirable decisions by causing
monetary loss. 97 The system forces individuals who may undertake
injury-producing behavior to contemplate the full costs of their proposed
course of action. The tort law objective of deterrence is supposed to have
people and, by extension society at large, consider the costs of a given
course of action on third parties. The tort system raises this cost to
individuals and as such, when that cost is prohibitive they are deterred
from undertaking the course of action. It is unimportant to the goal of
deterrence that the actual victim receive payment from the tortfeasor;
98
deterrence is accomplished simply by payment by the tortfeasor.'
Therefore, deterrence is best measured from the perspective of the
tortfeasor. Under the current claim market the tortfeasor is still forced to
deal with an adversary who is seeking to extract the most he can from
the defendant. This means that deterrence is left unchanged, because
there is still going to be a cost of choosing a tortious course of action to
the defendant. However, the market is changing to whom the right to
raise that costs belongs. Even if the claim was sold on a secondary
market, the defendant would still have a cost associated with ending the
claim by purchasing it through the market mechanism. The moment a
defendant seeks to purchase an outstanding claim against him, the price
will increase. This is because other market actors will infer that the
defendant believes the claim has some merit, or that the defendant is
willing to pay to settle the claim. Either way, the defendant is still going
to have financial repercussions as a result of a tortious course of action.
On the flip side, if the defendant was the one who paid another to
take on the liability, he is still being hit financially for his actions. In
such a scenario the defendant would have incurred an even greater
deterrent effect. Consider the reasons advocated for the defendant
wanting to give the liability to someone else, for example, they may not
want the publicity of the lawsuit or of liability. Furthermore, there is a
cost of enticing a party to decide to become liable. In essence the
defendant has realized that there is a cost associated with the actions
both in time used to negotiate the sale of liability and the money needed
to effectuate the sale.
197.

Stephen D. Sugarman, Symposium: Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory:

Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 558, 560 (1985).

198.

See O'Connell, supra note 19, at 706.
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There is also an argument that deterrence is enhanced by the
presence of the market. Under the traditional system there is a
discounting that occurs on the part of the tortfeasors. This is because
some victims with valid claims choose not to sue. 199 Courts in the past
have cited judicial efficiency or an increase in the amount of litigation as
a policy reason for their decisions. However, concerns that the market
will increase the number of tort claims, as a basis for not permitting the
market to be established, is not applicable. This is because the market is
not creating a new cause of action or right to compensation; it is merely
changing who is primarily responsible for sustaining the suit. It is
contrary to the fundamental principle of tort law, of allowing victims to
seek compensation via the courts, to suggest that those victims would be
putting an unbearable strain on the system.
It is important to reiterate that the market system proposed here
does not create any new cause of action; it merely shifts whose
responsibility it is to bring forth and sustain the suit. Therefore the fact
that these otherwise unpursued injuries may potentially be pursued by a
third party, in fact enhances the deterrent effect of the current system as
people and companies would be forced to consider their actions in the
face of more effective and efficient plaintiff litigation capabilities.
B. The Macro-TortEffects of the Market on Compensation
The compensation goal of tort law can be effectively summarized
as an attempt "to place the injured person in the position he or she would
have been but for the tortious conduct."2 00 Compensation has over the
years become a major focus of tort law, displacing deterrence and
becoming the "central purpose" of the courts. 20 The current tort system
does not provide perfect compensation to accident victims. Therefore,
any changes to the system that help to fulfill the premise above should
be considered beneficial. The market system proposed in this Note
would help bring compensation closer in line with the goal above.
Before examining the benefits of the market system, it is beneficial to
briefly highlight the shortcomings of the current compensation scheme.
There are three important scenarios of the current system that would be
helped by the market system: (i) the uncompensated/undercompenstated

199. See Sugarman, supranote 197, at 569.
200. In re Joint E. & S.Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 890 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1991).
201. See Sugarman, supra note 197, at 590.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

47

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 11
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1543

and (iii) the high
victim, (ii) the excessively compensated victim;
2
administrative expenses suffered by the victim.
The uncompensated victim is really a special case of the undercompensated victim where the compensation amounts to zero. These
cases are generally found in two scenarios, either, where the victim is
unable to bring a claim for various reasons, or where the victim brings a
claim but receives less then what they theoretically should receive
according to the compensation premise laid out above. A few of the
reasons for the lack of adequate compensation include: lack of a
plausible defendant, undue delay in proceedings, urgent financial need,
lack of proof, and a judgment-proof defendant. 20 3 If the market system
can mitigate even one of these factors then it will help to fulfill the
central premise of tort law.
The market system provides the most promise in alleviating the
problems caused by undue delay and urgent financial need. These two
factors operate in tandem, exacerbating each other. If there are
significant delays in the litigation process, resulting, for example from
delayed discovery or excessive discovery, then a victim who needs
money quickly for current bills may be forced to accept a lower
settlement than they otherwise would. Such a victim would therefore be
undercompensated. In some cases the victim might simply give up
altogether and become disenfranchised with the entire legal system and
forgo their valid claim. This in effect not only removes compensation
from the victim, but it also undermines the deterrent feedback that
tortfeasors receive through the tort system; such a victim would be
uncompensated.204
Recognizing the existence of these two factors it is possible to trace
how the market system would either help to alleviate the distortion on
compensation that they inflict, or leave the compensation goal
unaffected. Compensation would be unaffected because if the person
chose not to sell at all he or she is no worse off by the existence of the
market system. Their fundamental ability to enforce his or her rights
under the traditional system is completely unaffected. If, however, he or

202. STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL IN.URY LAW 36-40 (1989).
203. See id.
204. Id. It is important to note that an uncompensated or undercompensated victim, does not
include a situation where a person thinks that he or she should have deserved more, or in fact had no
valid claim. This section functions on the assumption that the victim had a valid and enforceable
cause of action and consequently an amount of compensation was due. It further assumes that
within a perfect system the victim would receive the amount of compensation exactly sufficient to
restore the victim to his pre-accident position the accident did not happen.
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she chose to sell his or her rights, the need for immediate cash is
satisfied, thereby addressing the twin concerns of delay and urgency.
Of course in order to be effective, the market system must not
lower the amount of compensation in order to solve the delay and
urgency problem. Presumably, the competitive forces that are associated
with a market will ensure that indeed what the victim receives is the
highest he or she can get, while still taking guaranteed money. Also, by
sidestepping litigation the victim will have presumably lowered his or
her transaction costs because of the lower risk associated with simply
selling their tort, as compared to litigating it. Therefore, by allowing a
victim the choice to sell his or her tort, the system has become more
efficient and effective at delivering the compensation required without
sacrificing the deterrence that is integral to the safety of society.
The overcompensated 20 5 victim is one where the defendant finds it
cheaper and easier to buy off the claim than to litigate it.20 6 This of
course implies that the claim is marginal or may not be the fault of the
defendant. This kind of claim will be effectively dealt with by the
market system in the following way: The defendant has the right to sell
his liability to another party. That party makes money by successfully
litigating or settling the claim for less than the defendant paid them. The
development of the market would create specialists in this kind of
arrangement who would be willing to litigate because a victory in
litigation would mean they make a profit. This mechanism would in
effect help to reduce the number of overcompensated victims, especially
those who are compensated as a result of marginal or frivolous claims.
This is because this kind of claim would be particularly profitable for the
purchaser of liability. It is important to note, that the market system
would not eliminate the overcompensated victim, but it would introduce
a party (the buyer of the defendant's liability) unwilling to settle for
convenience sake, and who has a great incentive to force any settlement
to as close to zero as possible.
This market effect will not harm those who have legitimate or
strong claims because nobody would buy a claim to lose money.
Therefore the kind of overcompensation that is addressed by the market
operation is probably limited to nuisance suits. But nonetheless the
reduction of these suits is a benefit to the defendant and to the legal
system, because as soon as the liability on the suit is sold it becomes

205. Id. at 38. An overcompensated victim is one who receives more compensation than he
deserves, in essence he is made more than whole by the tort system.
206. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

49

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 11
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1543

clear that the convenience reason for settlement has been neutralized.
The plaintiff in such a nuisance suit still has the right to bring the suit;
therefore any argument that they are worse off is unfounded.
Furthermore, the tort system should, if possible, try to discourage
frivolous suits and this mechanism has the potential to do so.
Finally, the third scenario is where victim compensation suffers
negatively, due to the high administrative costs incurred.20 7 As has been
mentioned throughout this Note the high transaction costs, which are
associated with people attempting to reduce their exposure to the risk of
no recovery, reduce the compensation available to the victim. The
market system also provides some respite from these deleterious effects
by shifting the risk to parties willing and able to bear it. To briefly recap
the mechanism by which this occurs, recall, that the if the victim of the
tort (seller) can find someone who is willing to buy their right to sue, the
transaction cost is lower than attempting to negotiate and it is certainly
lower then litigating. The party purchasing the suit has the opportunity to
capitalize on several different factors for example, economies of scale,
specialized expertise, and a fixed-salary legal counsel. Therefore the
market system provides an optional avenue for a victim to minimize
their transaction costs and maximize their compensation.
C. The Macro-TortEffects of the Market on Vengeance
Holmes recognized "that the early forms of legal procedure were
grounded in vengeance, 20 8 and that our legal system developed as
physical vengeance was slowly replaced by monetary vengeance. 20 9 He
further suggests that vengeance, played such an important role in the
development of the legal system because it "imports a feeling of blame,
and an opinion, however distorted by passion, that a wrong has been
done., 210 From here, the notion that if you are to blame then you are
liable, originates. 2 1 However, as he concluded, the moral and passionate
language of revenge, from where guilt and afortiori liability stems, is
continually shifting from moral standards into objective standards.2 12

207. See id. at 40.
208. See HOLMES, supra note 4, at 2.
209. See id. (tracing the evolution of the law from the roman blood feud to the composition
until Anglo-Saxon England where, by the time of William the Conqueror, even the composition had
been replaced with causes of action).
210. Seeid.at2-3.
211. See id. at 4.
212. Seeid.at27.
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the "actual guilt of the party concerned is wholly
This means 21that
3
eliminated.,
Professor Ehrenzweig recognized the same evolution as Holmes
believing that society had reached some "psychological maturity"
leading it to abandon the "eye for eye and tooth for tooth" philosophy of
justice. 214 He further observed, that the legal system employed devices to
determine fault and compensation, even though fault in the moral sense
was not applicable.2 15 Using Holmes' analogy, negligence law is no
longer concerned whether the dog was kicked or stumbled upon, rather
21 6
only if the reasonable person would have seen the dog and avoided it.
Professor King, recently observed "[t]here [are] serious doubts
about the continuing validity of this goal in modem tort law.,, 217 Of
course, the idea among civilized society to turn to violent self-help
measures is no longer an instinct of first response. Secondly, vengeance
has become subordinated to the economic based goal of
218
compensation.
Arguably the tort system has been evolving over the centuries,
away from vengeance and toward compensation. The market system
would further this evolution by reducing the vengeful tendencies that
may still affect the judgment of some, furthering the development of
civility in society. It is important to look at the possible emotional
reaction that a person can have after he or she has suffered a tortious
injury. There are two possibilities; a person can either, make decisions
rationally based on his or her economic needs and interests, or he or she
can decide that he or she wants to exact a pound of flesh from the
defendant. It is a fundamental premise of the argument presented, that
the former is a socially more efficient reaction, because then parties are
looking to compensate for the damage done and move on to other
activities. The latter option only stalls the ability of the parties to bring
closure to the unfortunate events and raises the costs of the accident to
all, most likely without benefit to anyone.
However, market system does help to remove the possibility of
vengeance affecting a victim's judgment. This is because, if the victim
feels that liability is predicated on guilt and wants to exact vengeance,
213.
214.
(1953).
215.
216.
217.

Seeid.
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 NW. U. L. REV. 855, 856
Seeid.at857.
See HOLMES, supra note 4, at 5.
Joseph J. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort

Law, 57 SMU L. REV 163, 181 (2004).
218. Id.
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irrational decision making may occur. However, in the event the victim
sells the claim, the buyer of this right is concerned with liability only, to
the extent that it will help or hinder his or her ability to successfully and
profitably convert the right to sue into compensation. The buyer, has
nothing but economic concerns; this disassociation of plaintiff and
victim as a byproduct, disassociates the human impulse of vengeance
from the system, while not sacrificing deterrence or compensation.
Punishment is achieved not as a result of the vengeance goal, but as
a byproduct of deterrence which is accomplished by the fixing of
adequate and reasonable compensation. This in economic terms is
called, forcing a party to internalize the externalities; in essence, the
party is forced to consider the costs of their actions. Therefore, any fear
that the defendant will not be punished under the market system, is not
viable because the compensation-deterrent feedback system is left
untouched.
The previous sections have detailed the workings and effects of the
market system. It is important to shift focus, examine, and address the
obstacles preventing the development of the system. The following
section analyzes the legal obstacles that must be overcome before the
market system proposed in this Note can develop.
VI.

CHIEF LEGAL OBSTACLES PREVENTING THE CREATION OF A
MARKET FOR TORT CLAIMS

It is difficult, if not impossible, to attempt to predict how the market
system would affect every area of law; however, there are some obvious
starting points which must be addressed, which will hopefully provide a
guide for answering the questions that, at this time, remain unasked. The
two basic legal areas to be addressed are (i) the laws of champerty,
maintenance, and barratry; and (ii) the public policy concerns that may
be raised.
A.

The InterrelatedDoctrines of Champerty, Maintenance, and
Barratty and Their Effect of BarringAssignment

The origin and evolution of these doctrines was examined in Part II.
There it was noted, that over the years these doctrines have increasingly
become obsolete, where some states have gone so far as to abolish them
without any deleterious effects on their jurisprudence. 219 As was
documented, if the law is no longer effective, it no longer serves any
219.

See supra Part II.C.l (discussing the approach in New Jersey and Massachusetts).
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purpose and it is impeding the development of beneficial legal and
economic doctrines, then it should be removed. 220 The main justification
for lifting a medieval practice is the advance of society. 22 1 Today,
society has reached a level where the relatively precise tools available in
the modem legal system do not justify such drastic and arcane measures,
which are relics from another time and place.
The major worry which these laws were intended to allay, was the
subversion of the legal system into a mechanism, by which, the
privileged would oppress the common folk. 2 The lack of an aristocratic
class structure, coupled with an independent judiciary and the adoption
of contingency fees has helped protect the legal system from such a
development. Therefore, even if the danger that these laws are intended
to remedy is still present, it is effectively taken care of by other more
narrowed and nuanced developments that were not present when the
laws originally were instituted. In medical practice, the evolution of
arthroscopic surgery has allowed doctors to cure the patient without
wielding the broad sword of the scalpel, much to the benefit of the
patient. So too, the legal system must remove the broad sword of
champtery and its sister doctrines, and recognize that they have been
replaced, by other less invasive legal techniques.
B. Public Policy Concerns of a Legal Nature
There are four public policy concerns that require some discussion.
This is not an exhaustive list, but these are the most crucial concerns that
need to be addressed. In keeping with the primary focus of this Note,
that the market system is pareto efficient, each one of these concerns is
either cast in an incorrect light or it is balanced by a competing
beneficial development. The four concerns are (i) the explosion of
litigation/ward of deep pockets, (ii) too low of a selling price, (iii)
unintended consequences of legislation, and (iv) offensiveness to
society. 223

220. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 ("It is revolting to
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.") Id.
221. See Choharis, supra note 16, at 463-64 ("Despite the evolution of our laws and society,
the bans endure.").
222. See generally Lampet's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 994, 997 (1727).
223. Paul Bond, Comment, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA.
L. REV 1297, 1310 (2002). The proposal presented in this Note takes the position that the comment
by Paul Bond calls "Private Champerty Allowed," and will address each one of his "concerns." Id.
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1. Explosion of Litigation
The primary concern under the explosion of litigation is two fold,
(i) that there will be an increase in the number of suits brought, and (ii)
there will be lawsuits on sale/assignment contract itself.224 The first basis
is unfounded and smacks of elitism while, the second, has broad
negative economic implications if it is considered a reasonable rationale.
In order to answer the first rationale, recall that
the market system
does not add any new cause of action; it merely shifts the rights of who
may pursue the suit. It dissociates victim from plaintiff and tortfeasor
from defendant, but does not create new defendants or plaintiffs.
Therefore, to suggest the courts will be flooded with new causes of
action is disingenuous. This concern is different from one that some may
have of an increase in the number of suits of already existing causes of
action.
There is a simple reply to this secondary concern, lawsuits are, and
should be, directly related to the number of tortious events occurring in
society. It is unreasonable and elitist to limit access to the courts to some
victims, because of the necessity and urgency they may experience. It is
also unfair to thrust them into a plaintiffs lawyer's arms in order to
recover but have to forgo a percentage of the claim and still take the risk
of losing in court. Under the market system, the victim could sell the
claim, get compensated and move on with life, without forgoing the
societal function of deterrence that is served by the tort system. If courts
or legislatures want to limit the number of suits then the solution must be
to limit the kinds of actions that result in claims, or to reduce the number
of claims by reducing the number tortious events that result in
compensable injury.
From a macro-tort perspective, the reality of the system should be
that a tortious event should be pursued regardless of size. Without
enforcement, the deterrent aspects of the system do not function and as
such, harmful behavior is likely to continue.
Therefore, an explosion in litigation of the number of new claims or
number of claims brought, is not a concern nor a by product of the
market system. As the market merely introduces efficiency into the
system, that will allow people redress for injuries that they may not have
otherwise had, it provides choice to those who would have already
sought redress.

224. See id. at 1311-12 (discussing the "wards of deep pockets" and the "weary, weary
courts").
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The efficiency of consolidation must not be overlooked either, it
has the potential to increase the number of settlements and keep the
number of cases that go to litigation lower. Suppose there is an accident
involving a passenger bus, where each victim suffers some actionable
injury. If each victim got his or her own lawyer then the defendant
would have to negotiate with a hydra of lawyers. If, however, every
claim was purchased by one entity, then the opportunity would exist of
one lump sum settlement. Such a settlement might be lower than the
individual settlements because of the potential from the buyer to reap a
profit from volume, whereas each of the victims might have wanted a
higher amount. Even if the case went to litigation, it would still be
efficient because it would be one trial, with one legal team on each side,
no need for coordination of many different people, and there would be
uniformity in the judicial outcome. Each plaintiffs injury would be
evaluated by a single jury; therefore, the assessment of damages would
be more uniform.
The second concern is that the assignment contracts themselves
could be a flash point for litigation. 225 This reason for concern, if
considered valid has incredibly deep economical and societal
implications. To suggest that people should not be allowed to enter into
contracts because they might end up litigating would bring the entire
modern free market system of economics to a screeching halt. The same
logic can be extended to suggest that mergers and acquisitions should
not be permitted because some of them end up falling apart and resulting
in litigation. Such an argument, when placed in the proper perspective,
really has no bounds and its chilling effect on economic activity suggests
that it should not be raised.
The point of litigation on the contract is still important to address.
In essence, the sale of a claim is no different then the sale of any other
good or service; as such, it would be regulated by the laws of contract.
However, there is no difference between this sale and one of any other
commodity; the law prevents a manufacturer from trying to reneg on a
sale contract because he has found another buyer who offers more
money. The same would happen if the original plaintiff decided to
invalidate the contract of sale; he would have to successfully navigate
the well-developed world of contractual law and demonstrate why the
contract should be rescinded.

225. See id. at 1312 (stating that the victim will try to "weasel out" of the contract once he sees
a windfall).
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2. Victims Who Sell for Too Little
Another concern is that the victim may sell his or her claim for too
little. 226 While addressing this concern, it is important to heed the words

of Milton Friedman discussed at the beginning of this Note, that a
voluntary exchange will not take place unless both parties believe they
will benefit from it.2 27 Therefore this concern should not really play a
significant role. Furthermore, the sale transaction is a contractual
transaction, as such, the defenses of contract are applicable and any sale
that occurs under duress or as a result of fraud would be subject to the
appropriate contractual remedies.
The market system also has another element that will help ensure
that a low sale price is not a result: competition. Competition between
buyers will tell the plaintiff how much their claim is worth, provided that
the plaintiff shops around. If there is no competition for the claim, it
should signal to the plaintiff he or she may not have a valid claim or that
there is something particularly risky about the claim he or she are
pursuing. At that point, the victim has the option of proceeding the
traditional way if he or she really believes in the claim, otherwise he or
she has received some objective determination of the validity of the
claim.
Lastly, the needed regulation of the market will also have an
opportunity to ensure that the plaintiff will get a fair price for his or her
claim. This, as will be discussed below, is most likely to occur by the
creation of a secondary market and the associated regulation detailing
participation within it. The secondary market will provide regulators the
ability to influence how business is done in the primary market.
3. Unintended Consequences of Legislation
This concern is a result of poor reasoning and a lack of faith in the
ability of legislatures to legislate what they mean. It also has an element
of unfairness to the poor, who suffer an injury from the tort. Using the
following example:
Suppose the legislature creates a new cause of action, good against
bioethicists whose negligent advice contributes to medical harm done
to subjects in research trials. The legislature strategically sets a high
potential punitive award capped at ten times compensatory damages,
knowing that most cash-strapped plaintiffs will only get a fraction of

226. See id. at 1310-11 (stating that the victim may sell his claim for less than he would have
received otherwise).
227.

See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 13.
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this in settlement. If champerty [assignment of claims] is allowed,
investor-backed plaintiffs no longer will be cash-strapped, with the
may be hit much harder than originally intended
result that bioethicists
228
by the legislature.
Laws are enforced by what they say. In the hypothetical the
legislature gives the right to claim punitive damages up to a certain
amount. If the legislature wants to make it more difficult to claim such
an amount, then it can do so. However, to suggest that it is beneficial for
only those who are wealthy enough to pursue litigation until the end,
deserve as their reward the shot at the damages, times ten, seems
patently unfair.
Furthermore, it is clear that if bioethicists want to avoid liability
they can simply not give out negligent advice. High awards, should not
be seen as a reason for preventing some people from getting their due. If
the legislature is concerned with the size of the payouts it may adjust the
damage ceiling. Therefore, this argument only makes any sense if one
believes that the legislature enacts legislation simply for show and does
not weigh the possibility that people might use it as effectively as they
see possible.
4. Offended Society
The "offended society" argument is based on the notion that when
the victim comes in to testify in court to fulfill her contractual
obligations, she is working as a proxy for a rich investor who is going to
profit from her misfortune. 229 This concern fails for two major reasons:
firstly, choice and secondly, she has already been compensated.
The victim made the decision to sell her rights to sue, in return for
consideration that she deemed appropriate. Therefore, if she is willing to
sell the rights to her misfortune, society should not be offended at that
prospect. She has made a decision that is in her best interest to undertake
the sale. She had the choice to proceed under the traditional manner, but
elected to sell the rights because she found it to be more advantageous.
Society is not offended when paid experts are called by parties in
litigation to give an expert opinion favorable to their clients. The victim
should be considered nothing more than a paid expert; her expertise is
what happened during the tortious event and the extent of her injuries.
The traditional expert is also doing everything in court as a "proxy for

228. Bond, supra note 223, at 1311-12.
229. Id. at 1312.
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that company's economic benefit., 230 Society has accepted the expert as
common place; in litigation there is no reason to suggest that it would
not accept the non-plaintiff victim in the same light.
Having examined the legal issues that the market system faces, it is
now important to consider the non-legal based concerns that must be
overcome in order to effectuate the creation of the market system.
NON-LEGAL ISsuES THAT NEED TO BE OVERCOME IN ORDER FOR

VII.

THE MARKET TO FUNCTION

Apart from the legal considerations addressed in the preceding
section, there are non-legal issues that require some attention. The focus
of this section will be on four separate areas; these areas are by no means
an exhaustive list, but they represent some of the major criticisms that
have been leveled at the idea of applying market principles to the tort
system. The four major areas are: regulation of the system, information
deficit, assured participation of the victim, and the formation of the
markets.
A.

Regulation of the Market

In order to have a properly functioning market, it must be
surrounded by the appropriate legal and institutional framework. 231 The
market system contemplated here is no different. Just as the stock market
requires government intervention to assure its fair and optimal
performance, the claims market would require a similar body. The
purpose of this section is to present some ideas that may be used as a
starting point for future research into the solution.
Choharis mentions that the tax code and security regulations will
have to be considered in any market regulation attempt.2 32 The required
changes or revisions to the tax code or the securities regulation acts are
something that would have to be achieved through the legislative
process. As a thought, however, the tax-free status of compensatory
damages might be adopted to allow for the tax-free purchase of claims,
where the purchaser would then pay taxes upon the sale. This would
allow the victim to maximize his or her award and allow the government
to take its share from people who are conducting themselves as business
people.
230.

Id.

231.

See BLAUG, supra note 164, at 62.

232. See Choharis, supra note 16, at 504. (discussing the tax-free status of compensatory
damages and the securities regulation requirements).
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The securities regulation may provide an adequate blueprint for the
type of regulation needed in a market for tort claims. The securities
regulatory system functions at two critical points, one is the original sale
and then again in the secondary transaction. 233 The two points of transfer
are the logical points for the government to assert the majority of its
regulatory power. By making requirements on the parties in order to
complete a valid sale, there will be incentives for the parties to conform
to the standards set out by the government. The control of access to the
secondary market is especially important because it provides liquidity
which as previously mentioned generates certainty.234 With this blueprint

in mind, the only things missing are the value judgments and the
preferred mechanism for enforcement, which is beyond the scope of this
Note.
B.

The Information Deficit Concern

The issues regarding information deficit may be the most oft raised
issue when someone is confronted with the market proposal.235
Generally the concern is raised from two perspectives (i) from the
buyer's point of view, and (ii) from the seller's point of view. The key
question from either perspective is how much is this particular claim
worth?
How the participants weigh and assess all the factors involved, is
the key question. The simple answer is that the market will do this; of
course this requires some explanation. The price system does more than
simply state how much something costs, it also conveys information to
the buyer, competitors, and potential buyers. Under the market system
the buyers would be in competition with each other to purchase the
claim and bring it to the secondary market. These buyers would have to
make assessments based on available information as to the likely worth
of the claim. Much of the information needed, would be no different
than the actuarial statistics that insurance companies presently use to
estimate the risk and probability of injury to a person when determining
premiums.
Furthermore, plaintiff lawyers would have an entirely new business
opportunity available to them as consultants. They are experts in
233. The Securities Act of 1933 regulates the primary market, whereas the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 regulates the secondary market.
234. See Choharis, supra note 16, at 503-04.
235.

See Alan Schwartz, Commentary on "Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims ": A

Long Way Yet to Go, 75 VA. L. REv. 423, 423 (1989) (commenting on the F-CC concept); Choharis,
supra note 16, at 505 (discussing the market demand for information in the current market).
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evaluating injuries and the probability of success and their worth. This
evaluation is no different than one that a potential buyer would make.
Therefore if it is possible for a lawyer to make the evaluation it is
certainly plausible for a business person to do so.
Once the market begins to operate there will be an inevitable
collection of information, which will reduce the costs of information in
the future, as people begin to track different awards in different
jurisdictions. This may even have the effect of standardizing, to a
degree, the worth of injuries across jurisdictional boundaries as people
begin to concern themselves with the relative worth of injuries.
Mr. Choharis suggests that in the current market those with the
ability to make available such information may sell it. 236 He also
suggests that unique and novel claims may not be marketable because
there may not be enough value in the claim to warrant the risk.237 He
further elaborates, that the most likely kinds of claims to be brought on
the market are those that are easily standardizable. 38 All of these
observations are correct and they hold for the F-CC market as well as the
current one. Anyone who develops an expertise in pricing will be a
sought after commodity. The claims most likely to be traded on the FCC are those that are easily conceived and which have sufficient
information to predict a basis for occurrence of the tort.
The special problem posed by the F-CC market is not novel,
consider the development of the catastrophe bond. The catastrophe bond
is a financial instrument where investors purchase the bond and receive
interest on it, but if a catastrophe enumerated by the bond occurs they
lose their investment. 239 The purchase of a security without knowing
whether the event it is tied to will occur, is similar to the kind of
purchase occurring in the F-CC market. Admittedly the risk in the F-CC
market is greater for the purchasing party; however a larger risk should
not be a sufficient reason to discount the entire proposal. The purpose of
the market proposal is to shift risk, by using the market mechanism in a
socially and individually beneficial way.

236. Id. at 505.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. David C. Croson and Howard C. Kunreuther, Customizing Reinsurance and Cat Bonds for
Natural HazardRisks, at 8, at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/99/9934.pdf (1999) (detailing
the basic working of a catastrophe bond).
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C. Assuring Participationof the Victim After the Sale
Assuring the participation of the victim-seller with any litigation
after the sale of the claim is of paramount importance. Once again this
problem is best left to the individuals to experiment with and solve.
However, it is essentially an issue of incentives, returning to the expert
example discussed earlier; if the victim seller is treated as an expert and
is given the appropriate incentives their participation will be assured. A
simple example of such a structuring of incentives would be delaying
payment until the victim has fulfilled his or her obligations as stipulated,
according to the sale terms.
The other kinds of participation that are required, such as,
documents that may be confidential (i.e. medical records) would also be
contractually provided for in the sale. The enforceability of the original
sale contract would likely play a big role in the pricing of the claim on
the secondary market. Therefore the incentive is for the primary
purchaser to be very thorough. The trustworthiness of the victim will
also be of importance, because of the way it may play to the jury.
All of these considerations however are best left to the negotiation
of the parties. Just as the terms of any specific sale agreement are most
efficiently determined by the needs of the involved parties, so too, the
specific concerns and needs of the parties involved in the primary
transaction will be negotiated out in the most beneficial manner. With
those ideas and concepts that prove themselves to be successful being
copied and duplicated by other market participants.
D. The Natural Formationof a Future-ContingentClaim Market
The final issue to be addressed under this section is unique to the FCC market: it is the question of whether the market will generate itself
naturally even if it was permissible to do so. 24° There are two answers to
this concern: (i) the lack of a naturally occurring market under today's
economic realities should not be a sufficient reason to legally prevent its
existence in the future; and (ii) a novel idea needs time to germinate and
develop.
That a market has not sprung up as of now is not reason to legally
ban its ability to come to fruition in the future. The market may depend
on the development of actuarial models or just actual trial and error on
the part of an enterprising investor and willing participants. Just as all

240. Schwartz, supra note 235, at 429.
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other financial products and tools did not develop at the same time, so
too, it may take time for the market to become naturally occurring.
Another key consideration is that much of the experience that
would be gained in the current market would be transferable to the future
market. Therefore, the lack of a specialized body of knowledge and
expertise that would be honed and developed in the current market,
because of legal obstacles, is one of the primary reasons that potential
future market participants have been unwilling to explore the F-CC
market possibilities.
Turning to the second reason, the F-CC is a novel idea. It brings
together at least three fields of expertise: legal, actuarial, and financial. It
takes time for the interaction of these fields to reach a point sophisticated
enough, whereby potential market participants have the tools necessary
to make informed decisions. These tools include among other things
access to the actuarial data needed to make an informed decision, the
best way to structure legal services that such a market would need, and
the financial modeling of how such a transaction should be structured to
achieve the most benefit.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The market system for tort claims is a pareto efficient mechanism,
which would create several beneficial results to the parties involved,
without affecting substantive tort law. The market will exist on two
different temporal planes: the current market operating only with claims
where the injury has already been sustained; whereas, the futurecontingent market will deal with claims where the injury has yet to
occur. The primary purpose of either market is to allow for the efficient
shifting of risk to parties most willing to bear it. The benefits of each
market are also seen on the micro-tort and the macro-tort levels.
The current market provides advantages on both the micro and
macro-tort levels. Primarily, it provides a person a third option to
consider when evaluating what to do with a potential claim without
affecting the right of the victim to settle or litigate in the traditional
manner. The existence of the option provides the party with leverage
when going into negotiations with the tortfeasor; it also provides an
independent valuation of the claim. This second piece of information is
valuable to both the defendant and plaintiff. The defendant may use it as
an independent gauge of the strength of the claim.
From the defendant's perspective the extra information and the
option to sell off the liability provide benefits that are otherwise
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unavailable in the current system. By being able to sell liability to, for
example, a specialist in such claims the defendant can avoid the
possibility of higher than expected costs associated with the claim.
The micro-tort perspective of the future-contingent market operates
on the same principle as the current market, with the key difference that
the seller is swapping one type of risk for another. They are evaluating
the possibility of suffering a tort, going to court and losing, against
suffering a tort and offsetting its costs with the money made from the
sale. Under the F-CC market, the seller is rewarded for avoiding injury,
this is beneficial as it breeds a safety-conscious individual.
The macro-tort perspective of both markets is the same. The key
consideration is the effect of the market (both the current and F-CC
markets) on the twin goals of deterrence and compensation; and the
reduction of vengeance as a motivating factor once a sale has occurred.
Deterrence, is left unchanged at worst, or is enhanced by the bringing of
meritorious suits that otherwise would not be brought; this will lead to
greater internalization of generated externalities by tortfeasors.
Compensation is enhanced, because of the efficiencies introduced,
therefore victims get their compensation faster and do not have to bear
the normal costs of litigation or traditional settlement. Vengeance on the
other hand has slowly been receding as a valid objective of the tort
system; by separating plaintiff from victim, the tort market furthers this
goal. This produces an opportunity for increased settlements and
reductions in litigation.
The potential concerns raised by the operation of the claims market
are not sufficient enough to forgo the creation of the market. Rather, if
they are legitimate, they are best addressed by regulation, which is
probably best achieved by mechanisms that operate at the two points of
transaction: the primary sale and the sale to the secondary market. The
solutions to these problems require further analysis and study, but they
are not insurmountable, nor does any one of them raise enough of an
issue to suggest that the entire concept of the market would be a negative
addition to the current tort regime.
The legal obstacles should be removed because they no longer
function to cure the harms that they were intended to prevent. There are
other legal developments that have superseded these ancient relics and
more effectively prevent the abuse of the disadvantaged through the
legal system.
The possibilities that the market system would make available to all
parties, could effectively change the way a large number of people
interact with the tort system, the financial system, and with each other. It
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has the potential to increase the safety of society and to introduce
efficiencies into a system, which sorely needs to take steps to be more
efficient instead of paying lip service to it.
Overall, the market system as envisioned here has the potential to
expand the access to justice for more claims. Further, it will allow
people to make economic decisions when dealing with possible life
altering misfortune, provide people with options in order to make the
decisions that are in their best interest, and fundamentally change for the
better the social interactions of individuals.
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